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This thesis explores Chinas evolving security strategy through the case study of 
the changes in its position regarding the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 
the mid-1990s.  In so doing, this thesis demonstrates the evolution of Chinas 
involvement in the regional multilateral security cooperation over the years.  
During this period, there were similar changes in Chinas position towards some 
other international organizations and arrangements.  All these changes reflect 
adjustment of Chinas grand strategy.  China has gradually learned to make use 
of multilateral regimes for its national interests.  Multilateral diplomacy has now 
occupied a more important position in Chinas strategic thinking than ever 
before. 
 
This study has also demonstrated that the theory of realism, despite its utilities, 
has been weak in explaining Chinas proactive behaviour in the ARF and its 
support for multilateralism.  This study points to the need for a modified realist 
framework that takes into account Chinese characteristics in reading Chinas 
diplomacy and strategic thinking. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, the utility of multilateral mechanism has gained 
more attention in the Asian-Pacific region.  The states of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have manifested a clear preference for 
multilateral approaches towards regional security.  This preference arises 
primarily from their concern over the uncertainty in the regional security 
environment.  The emergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) reflected 
this concern. 
 
But not every regional power has the same interest in multilateralism as 
ASEAN states do.  Big powers usually prefer bilateralism to multilateralism.  
China is no exception.  Moreover, Beijing used to view multilateralism in the 
Asia-Pacific region as an attempt to encircle and contain China as a rising 
power.  Hence, its initial reaction to the emergence of the ARF was one of 
suspicion and hesitancy.  For instance, during the first ARF Senior Officials 
Meeting (SOM) in Bangkok in May 1994, when Australia, with Canadian 
support, took the initiative to promote confidence-building measures (CBMs) by 
establishing working groups among senior officials, China, however, resisted the 
move and any other concrete measures for security cooperation.  But China soon 
became confident and cooperative in the ARF.  During the second working 
2 
session of the ARF in Brunei, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen noted that 
his government and those of ASEAN states had discussed and reached 
consensus on how the ARF ought to proceed.1  It was also during this meeting 
that China, for the first time, expressed its endorsement for this multilateral 
enterprise and associated itself with the Chairmans Statement that referred to a 
collective concern over competing claims to sovereignty. 2   By 1997, it had 
become an active participant both in the ARF and the so-called track-two - the 
unofficial dialogue process that complements official deliberations in the forum.3  
In March 1997, it co-chaired with the Philippines an ARF Inter-sessional 
Support Group on Confidence Building Measures (ISG on CBMs) in Beijing.  It 
has since then played an active role in the regional security cooperation within 
the framework of the ARF.  These changes signal a shift in Chinas regional 
security strategy. 
 
 While this shift has been observed by some scholars,4 it is nonetheless an 
interesting topic deserving more attention.  Particularly, considering the ARFs 
                                                
1 Michael Leifer, China in Southeast Asia: Interdependence and Accommodation, CAPS Papers, no. 14 
(Taipei: the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, January 1997), p. 13. 
2 Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum ─ extending ASEANs model of regional security (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 43. 
3 Rosemary Foot, China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of 
Thought, Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 5 (May 1998), p. 426. 
4 For example, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and 
International Relations Theory, in Ikenberry, G. John and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), International 
Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 107-162; Evelyn 
Goh and Amitav Acharya, The ASEAN Regional Forum and US-China Relations: Comparing Chinese and 
American Positions, submitted for the Fifth China-ASEAN Research Institutes Roundtable, (Hong Kong: 
University of Hong Kong, 2002); and Rosemary Foot, op. cit. 
3 
unique position as a platform for multilateral security dialogue in Asia Pacific 
and Chinas important role in the regional security environment, this author 
believes that it is necessary to conduct a full investigation of Chinas behaviour 
in the ARF.  As there is so far no major scholarly work that focuses on detailed 
examination of Chinas behaviour in the ARF, this thesis makes a contribution 
by undertaking such a detailed study for a better understanding of Chinas 




Many China scholars in the West are upset about Chinas rising power and its 
regional security strategy and stress the need to contain China.5  For instance, in 
his article Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng, 6  Allen S. 
Whiting distinguished three types of nationalisms: affirmative, assertive and 
aggressive.  He concluded that assertive behaviour was likely to implement 
assertive rhetoric in future Chinese policy as Chinas military strength increased.  
Samuel S. Kim in China as a Great Power7  argued that Chinas creeping 
maritime expansionism had extended beyond coastal waters in the 1990s and 
that Chinese leaders were shifting from the pretence of being a global power to 
                                                
5 For a widely cited statement of this perspective, for example, see Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, 
The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, distributed by Random House, 1997). 
6 Allen S. Whiting, Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy, The China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995), 
pp. 295-316. 
7 Samuel S. Kim, China as a Great Power, in The China Reader: the Reform Era, edited by Orville Schell 
and David Shambaugh (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), pp. 449-459. 
4 
actually becoming a dominant regional military power in Asia.  Gerald Segal 
viewed China as a powerful, unstable non-status quo power and believed that 
economic interdependence had bought no protection from the forces of Chinese 
nationalism.  Thus, he suggested a policy of constrainment to deal with 
China.8  Likewise, Denny Roy argued that a burgeoning China posed a long-
term danger to Asia-Pacific security.  He noted: a stronger China will be subject 
to the same pressures and temptations to which other economically and militarily 
powerful countries of recent history succumbed.  Each sought to dominate the 
part of the globe within its reach.9 
 
These interpretations are mainly based on Western experiences.  Many 
international relations theorists in the West tend to see a rising China as a 
disruptive element in the current international system.  They are concerned that 
Chinas rapid rise will lead to conflicts that could threaten regional security and 
world order. 
 
The hegemonic-instability theory claims that incongruity between a rising 
powers growing capabilities and its continued subordinate status in an 
international political system dominated by an erstwhile hegemon will result in 
                                                
8 Gerald Segal, East Asia and the Constrainment of China, in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones 
and Steven E. Miller (eds.), East Asian Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 159-187. 
9 For detailed arguments, see Denny Roy, Hegemon on the Horizon? Chinas Threat to Eastern Asian 
Security, in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), East Asian Security 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), p. 124. 
5 
conflicts that are typically resolved through war.10  Based on this reasoning, the 
theory expects that a rising China that seeks greater benefits and influence in the 
international affairs will challenge the worlds reigning hegemon.  The balance 
of power theory11 also predicts a determined Chinese effort to counter the United 
States as an unchecked power though it does not indicate the inevitability of war.  
Moreover, the theorys core argument about balancing behaviour suggests that 
Chinas increasing capabilities are likely to trigger a reaction among those most 
concerned about the uses to which its power can be put.  The theory of security 
dilemma 12  also expects that Chinas increasing power will contribute to 
growing international conflict.  All the three theories base their arguments on the 
structure and dynamics of shifting power in the international relations, and 
emphasize on the circumstances and consequences associated with the rise and 
fall of the dominant powers.  They often overemphasize the challenge of a rising 
China to regional and global security and stability. 
                                                
10 For a broader understanding, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
11  The major assumptions of the theory include: 1) There is a natural tendency for states to seek 
regional/global hegemony; 2) Other states will seek to prevent hegemony by strengthening themselves or 
entering anti-hegemonic alliances with other threatened states; 3) A balance of power is desirable because it 
preserves the independence of countries and creates an equilibrium that promotes order and peace.  For 
further readings of this theory, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979) and Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical 
Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
12 This theory is closely related to the balance of power theory.  It asserts that unavoidable uncertainty about 
others capabilities and intentions, combined with the difficulty of establishing binding commitments under 
anarchy, means that each states effort to enhance its security poses a potential threat to which others are 
likely to respond.  For in-depth explanations, see John H. Herz, Idealist Internationalism and the Security 
Dilemma, World Politics, vol. 2, no. 2 (January 1950); Robert Jervis, Cooperation under the Security 
Dilemma, World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (January 1978); and Glenn H. Snyder, The Security Dilemma in 
Alliance Politics, World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4 (July 1984). 
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The institutionalist approach13 emphasizes on organizational practices which, 
according to the theory, can shape the regional security environment and, thus, 
affect each individual states regional policy.  The institutionalists doubt the 
weak institutional security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region are sufficient 
to constrain the behaviour of an increasingly powerful China.  Compared with 
above theories, the economic interdependence theory14 and the nuclear peace 
theory15 offer a benign scenario of Chinas rise.  Chinas current rapid economic 
growth is fuelled by increased in-flow of huge foreign investment.  The 
economic interdependence theorists note that Chinas behaviour could thus be 
constrained due to its need for foreign trade and investment to sustain its growth, 
which is necessary for its emergence as a great power.  In other words, they view 
Chinas overall strategy as also being economically motivated.  In the view of 
the nuclear peace theory, the devastating cost of nuclear confrontation among 
                                                
13 The institutional perspective depicts formal and informal organizational practices that mitigate the effects 
of anarchy, dampen conflict, and enhance the prospects for cooperation.  For further readings of this 
perspective, see Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1995); and John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an 
Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
14 The theory identifies incentives for states to contain their international disputes when the costs of conflict 
are great (because one alienates valued economic partners) and the benefits from the use of force are small 
(because the foundations of modern economic and military power depend less on assets like labour and 
natural resources that conquerors can seize and more on knowledge and its technological fruits).  For 
further readings of this theory, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence: 
World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977); and John E. Mueller, The 
Obsolescence of Major War, in Richard K. Betts (ed.), Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes 
of War and Peace (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1994). 
15 The theory asserts that among the great powers the nuclear revolution has resulted in relationships of 
mutual deterrence that provide not only robust buffers against general war, but also strong constraints on 
both limited war and crisis behaviour.  For further readings of this theory, see Bernard Brodie, War and 
Politics (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1973); Kenneth N. Waltz, Nuclear Myths and Political 
Realities, American Political Science Review, vol. 84, no. 3 (September 1990), pp. 731-745; and Robert J. 
Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1993), esp. Part III. 
7 
nuclear powers leads to their mutual deterrence.  Consequently, each of them is 
highly constrained when making regional security approaches.  Furthermore, 
uncertainties out of Chinas increasing power will be overshadowed by certainty 
about the unacceptable damage that even a small nuclear exchange could 
engender.  Table 1 lists the main arguments of above-discussed theories 
regarding Chinas rise. 
 
Table 1 Theories on Chinas Rise 
 
Theory Core arguments Predictions of Chinas policy change 
Hegemonic-
instability 
! Incongruity between a rising 
powers growing capabilities 
and its continued subordinate 
status in an international 
political system dominated by 
an erstwhile hegemon will 
result in conflicts that are 
typically resolved through 
war. 
! With increasing 
capabilities, China will 
try to gain regional 
hegemony and it will 
result in rivalry with 
regional big powers. 
Balance of 
power 
! There is a natural tendency 
for states to seek 
regional/global hegemony; 
! Other states will seek to 
prevent hegemony by 
strengthening themselves or 
entering anti-hegemonic 
alliances with other 
threatened states; 
! A balance of power is 
desirable because it preserves 
the independence of countries 
and creates an equilibrium 
that promotes order and 
peace. 
! Regional hegemony is 
the motivation for 
Chinas security 
decision-making. 
! Chinas rise could pose 
the dangers identified 





! Unavoidable uncertainty 
about others capabilities and 
intentions, combined with the 
difficulty of establishing 
binding commitments under 
anarchy, means that each 
states effort to enhance its 
security poses a potential 
threat to which others are 
! China will endeavour 
to increase its strength 
for ensuring vital 
interest in defending 
national sovereignty. 
! In turn, Chinas such 
efforts could worsen 
the intense regional 
security situation. 
8 
likely to respond. 
Institutionalism 
! Formal and informal 
organizational practices 
mitigate the effects of 
anarchy, dampen conflict, and 
enhance the prospects for 
cooperation. 
! Weak institutional 
arrangements in Asia 
Pacific have not yet 
provided sufficient 
constraints on the 
international behaviour 




! The foundations of modern 
economic and military power 
depend less on assets like 
labour and natural resources 
that conquerors can seize and 
more on knowledge and its 
technological fruits, but states 
will contain their 
international disputes when 
the costs of conflict are great 
and the benefits from the use 
of force are small. 
! Economic 
consideration is a very 
important factor in the 
formation of Chinas 
security strategy. 
Nuclear peace 
! Nuclear weapons 
revolutionize international 
politics by fundamentally 
altering the costs of conflict 
among the great powers; 
! Thus, the nuclear revolution 
has resulted in relationships 
of mutual deterrence that 
provide not only robust 
buffers against general war, 
but also strong constraints on 
both limited war and crisis 
behaviour. 
! The powerful nuclear 
constraints on policy-




These theories, despite their utilities, cannot convincingly explain the 
change in the behaviour of Chinas diplomacy and its regional security strategy 
since late 1990s.  In order to understand Chinas external behaviours, we have to 
look into its domestic consideration to see how it affects its external behaviour. 
 
In the study of Chinas involvement in multilateral organizations, many 
Western scholars subscribe to the theory that China is pursuing a calculative 
9 
strategy,16 or realpolitik.  For example, Alastair Iain Johnston argued: China has 
historically exhibited a relatively consistent hard realpolitik or parabellum 
strategic culture that has persisted across different structural contexts into the 
Maoist period (and beyond).17  Thomas J. Christensen also wrote: China may 
well be the high church of realpolitik in the post-Cold War world.18  Rosemary 
Foot held a similar opinion and pointed at realpolitik as behind Chinas 
multilateralist behaviour.  She noted that realpolitik made it particularly 
difficult for China to give up relative gains for absolute ones and rendered it 
prone to adopt narrow self-interested behaviour and be intolerant and wary of 
temporary imbalances in benefit.19 
 
Indeed, China calculates the costs and benefits of joining a multilateral 
organization, but so do many other countries.  Generally speaking, when China 
at first resisted joining to multilateral mechanisms, it was out of the calculation 
of relative gains as the history tells that big powers always prefer unilateralism 
in order to gain advantage over small powers.  When China later changed its 
                                                
16 Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis referred to Chinas current grand strategy as the calculative 
strategy.  One important character of this strategy was an expanded involvement in regional and global 
interstate politics and various international, multilateral fora, with an emphasis, through such interactions, 
on attaining asymmetric gains.  For more details of this analysis, see Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. 
Tellis, Interpreting Chinas Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2000). 
17 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The 
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), p. 217. 
18 Thomas J. Christensen, Chinese Realpolitik, Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 1996), p. 37. 
19 Foot, op. cit., p. 436. 
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attitude towards multilateralism, this could also be explained as a calculative 
effort based on its comparison of benefits and costs of its participation. 
 
However, a deeper analysis is needed beyond a simplistic description of 
Chinas strategy as calculative and realpolitik.  To explore Chinas security 
strategy and its calculations to participate in multilateral organizations, it is 
necessary, first of all, to study its overall national development strategy and 
agenda.  Many scholars choose to emphasize Chinas military development, 
drawing an analogy with Wilhelmine Germany or post-Meiji imperial Japan.  
However, the world after the Cold War is a different normative structure 
compared with previous era.  These scholars largely overlook the essential 
determinant of Chinas foreign policy: experiential and learning effects.  In 
another word, they suffer from the fallacies of undifferentiation. 
 
Going through the German history, Harold James identified a connection 
between the surge of the German nationalism and the German national-identity 
dynamic and its specific historical environment.  German nationalism quickly 
withered after its defeat of World War II while its previous defeats in 1806 and 
1918 had only fuelled its more aggressive nationalism.  Harold James explained 
this puzzle by examining the changing international norms that had moulded 
11
 
German national role expectations.20  Using this reasoning, we can see Chinas 
current international environment is different from those where Wilhelmine 
Germany and post-Meiji Japan were in.  Chinas priority today is economic 
growth, but not military expansion.21 
 
Central Research Questions 
 
Based on the above review of relevant studies, this thesis addresses the 
following questions.  What are the changes in Chinas regional security strategy?  
How and why did China change its initial attitude towards multilateral 
organizations?  Are these changes a temporary adaptation or a constant cognition?  
To answer these questions, this study focuses on Chinas behaviour at the ARF, 
but also touches upon its position on other multilateral organizations as a 
comparison for a better demonstration. 
 
Why choose the ARF as the case study?  First, the ARF is a regional 
multilateral security forum, which fits tightly with this study.  From the 
beginning, the ARF has been constructed as a venue for multilateral dialogue on 
                                                
20 Harold James, A German Identity: 1770 to the Present Day (London: Phoenix Press, 1994). 
21 In Chinas National Defence in 1998, for example, when generalizing the international security situation, 
it stated that in international relations, geopolitical, military security and ideological factors still played a 
role that cannot be ignored, but the role of economic factors was becoming more outstanding.  See The 
International Security Situation, in Chinas National Defence (Beijing: Information Office of the State 
Council of the PRC, July 1998).  http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/2(1).html 
12
 
security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.  Secondly, the ARF is the first 
inclusive security arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region, and its membership 
includes, in addition to the ASEAN countries and China, other major Asia-
Pacific powers, such as the United States, Japan, Russia, Republic of Korea, 
Australia and India.  The Forum is an instrument to share information, promote 
confidence-building measures and enhance the practice of transparency.  
Furthermore, it provides opportunities for regional powers to defuse tensions 
that may arise from various crises.  For example, the second annual ARF session 
was held against the background of deteriorating China-U.S. relations, after 
Taiwans President Lee Teng-hui was issued a visa to visit the United States in 
June 1995.  Consequently, the ARF meeting in late June provided an avenue for 
Washington and Beijing to initiate a process of diplomatic dialogue to defuse the 
tension. 
 
For the purpose of analysis, this study adopts a behaviour-centred approach.  
It is a way to minimize the ambiguity and mystique of state behaviour by 
focusing on discrete, observable, and empirical units, such as the diplomatic 
activities of political leaders in various contexts and issue areas, national 
statements and documents.  Thus, Chinas security strategy can be explored 
through its external behaviours designed to affect the international situation or 




Furthermore, as realists argue that national interest22 is the most important 
element in deciding a states policy, it is particularly important to identify 
Chinese leaders perception of the countrys national interests before exploring 
its external behaviours and strategic thinking.  The collapse of the Soviet Union 
greatly influenced Chinese leaders perception of power.  Ideological differences 
do not carry the same pre-eminence in the leaders strategic thinking as before.  
The underlying basis of power and security has shifted towards an emphasis on 
economic strength at the expense of more single-minded pursuits of military 
strength.  This shift is observed not only from Chinas public statements, but 
also from its diplomatic behaviours.  Economic issues are given a higher priority 
in Chinese strategic thinking than at any other time since 1949.  Consequently, 
Chinas foreign policy and regional strategy are subject to this shift.  As 
confirmed by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, the top priority of 
Chinas foreign policy is to maintain a stable peripheral environment so as to 
safeguard normal economic circumstances at home.23 
 
                                                
22 The national interest, on the one hand, refers to the overall common good of an entire society, which 
necessarily looks inward to the basic principles of the domestic regime.  On the other hand, it also covers 
the discrete objects of value over which states bargain in world politics.  Therefore, a states national 
interest is multi-faceted.  Primary is the states survival and security.  Also important is the pursuit of wealth 
and economic growth and power.  For detailed discussion, see W. David Clinton, The National Interest: 
Normative Foundations, The Review of Politics, vol. 48, no. 4 (1986), pp. 495-519. 
23 Michael Leifer, China in Southeast Asia: Interdependence and Accommodation, in David S. G. 
Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (London: Routledge, 
1997), p. 156. 
14
 
Chinese perception of power can be best understood by the term 
comprehensive national power (CNP), which refers to the combined overall 
conditions and strengths of a country in numerous areas.  CNP is the aggregate 
of a variety of factors, such as territory, natural resources, military force, 
economic power, social conditions, domestic government, foreign policy, and 
international influence.24  It differs from the traditional perception of power that 
emphasizes predominantly on military power.  Chinas assessment of CNP is 
made both qualitatively and quantitatively.  Its CNP is not only evaluated in 
general discussions of the countrys strengths and weaknesses, but also 
measured by the use of formulas to calculate numerical values of CNP.  In 
particular, it rejects using gross national product (GNP) indexes or the 
measurement methods of national power as used in the United States.  Instead, 
Chinese analysts have developed their own extensive index systems and 
equations for assessing CNP, and their analytical methods are not traditional 
Marxist-Leninist dogma or Western social science but something unique to 
China.25  The Chinese pursuit of this power, i.e. CNP instead of a simple military 
strength, obviously affects its designing and pursuit of its regional security 
strategy and its behaviour at the ARF. 
 
                                                
24 For further explanation of CNP, see Huang Shuofeng, Zonghe Guoli Xinluun: Jianlun Xin Zhongguo 
Zonghe Guoli [New Theory on Overall National Strength: also on Chinas Overall National Strength] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1999). 
25 For elaborate descriptions of Chinese assessments of CNP, see Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the 





In the study of international relations, rationalism and constructivism provide 
two major points of contestation.26  In the study of Chinas strategic thinking and 
foreign policy, many scholars, as noted above, adopt rationalism.  All rationalists 
rely on the assumption of rationality to provide the crucial link between features 
of the environment  power, interests, and institutional rules  and actor 
behaviour.27  But due to different emphasis on the features of the environment, 
the rationalists are divided into many strands.  Among them, realist and liberal 
arguments are the two dominant thinking, and they are some of the most basic 
frames of thinking to explain and understand world politics that has withstood 
the test of time. 
 
Realism 
Realism is a broad theoretical school, embracing a variety of authors and works.  
It could be divided into two general schools: classical realism and modern 
realism.  Classical realism can be traced back as far as Thucydides.  The 
definitive treatises of the classical realist school of thought are E. H. Carrs The 
Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939 and Hans Morgenthaus Power Among 
                                                
26 For detailed discussion, see Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, 
International Organization and the Study of World Politics, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4 
(Autumn 1998), pp. 645-685. 
27 Ibid., p. 679. 
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Nations.28  Raymond Aron is also an outstanding scholar in classical realism.29  
But some of the ideas they offer have been modified by newer members of the 
realism school and serve to prompt new theoretical research.30  For example, 
Morton Kaplan depicts several types of international systems by drawing partly 
on game theory.31  Kenneth Waltzs Theory of International Politics is the most 
prominent effort to build up a precise and parsimonious model of modern 
realism.32  Sharing Waltzs core assumptions of modern realism and focusing on 
the dynamics of system change, Robert Gilpins War and Change in World 
Politics is also a significant study in modern realism. 
 
Major realist assumptions can be condensed as following: 
 
(1) Realists are pessimistic about human nature.  There are several 
limitations in the extent to which political reform or education can alter 
human nature: Humankind is evil, sinful, and power seeking.  The 
                                                
28 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(London: Macmillan Publishers, 1964); Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, distributed by Random House, 
1985). 
29 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 
Publishing, 1966), translated from French by Richard Howard and Annett Baker Fox. 
30 For a thorough observation of changes and continuity in realist thought, see the appendix to Ashley J. 
Tellis, Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory, in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), 
The Roots of Realism (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1996), pp. 3-100. 
31 See Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley Publishing, 
1957). 
32 See Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
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international conduct of states is largely shaped by certain immutable 
factors, such as geography and the nature of human behaviour. 
(2) Nation-states are the key actors in the international community and all 
other actors in the world are of lesser significance.  The politics of the 
world make up an international anarchy of sovereign states.  Anarchy 
causes states to undertake self-help measures: no other states can be 
relied upon, especially for security.  International relations are basically 
conflictual and would be ultimately resolved by war. 
(3) From the view of realists, international politics are power politics.  
The goal, means and uses of power are the central preoccupations of 
political activities.  The conduct of foreign policy is an instrumental 
activity based on intelligent calculation of ones power and interests 
against the power and interests of rivals or competitors. 
(4) Realists have a high regard for the importance of national security, state 
survival, and international order and stability.  They usually believe that 
there are no international obligations - in the moral sense of the word - 
between independent states. 
(5) Realists hold that there are gradations of capabilities among nation-
states --- greater powers and lesser powers --- in the decentralized 
international system.  The most important states in world politics are the 
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great powers.  International relations are primarily struggles among the 
great powers for domination and security. 
(6) Realists believe that domestic politics can be clearly separated from 
foreign policy.  The foreign policy of a state is primarily a response to 
external forces. 
(7) The realists place a great deal of importance on the traditional theory of 
balance of power and often use it to describe international security 
situations and power management of states. 
 
Nevertheless, no theory about international relations is without its critics. 
Realism is not an exception: 
 
(1) As globalisation and regional integration make great progresses, 
the clearly defined separation of domestic politics and foreign 
policy assumed in realism becomes blurred.  In the making of a 
states foreign policy, domestic politics are becoming as important 
as, if not more important than, external issues. 
(2) The use of the term balance of power in realists writings is 
fraught with inconsistent meanings.  This confusion derives from 
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the traditional theory of balance of power itself.33  But realists 
also cannot give an exact definition of this term. 
(3) Realists cannot adequately explain the trend of integration in the 
contemporary world and collective global problems, such as 
famine, environmental degradation and human rights abuses. 
 
Liberalism 
Liberalist thinking is closely connected with the rise of the modern constitutional 
state.  Similar to realist theories, the liberalist school comprises of several 
strands, such as republican liberalism, interdependence liberalism, cognitive 
liberalism, sociological liberalism and institutional liberalism.34  And the major 
liberalist works include Karl Deutsch, David Mitrany, Earnst Haas, Edward 
Morse, Richard Cooper, Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye. 35   As major 
challengers to realism, liberalists have converged on another set of explanation 
on international politics. 
                                                
33 Ernst Haas uncovered eight different meanings of the phrase balance of power, while Martin Wight 
found nine.  For the discussion of various definitions, see Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History 
and Theory (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1-23. 
34 For a detailed description of these strands of liberal theories, see Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Mattew, 
Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands, in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.), 
Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. 
Martins Press, 1995), pp. 121-137. 
35 Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, International Organization in the 
Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); David Mitrany, A Working 
Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966); Earnst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism 
and International Organization (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964); Edward S. Morse, The 
Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence and Externalization, World Politics, 
vol. 22, no. 3 (April 1970), pp. 371-392; Richard Cooper, Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policies 
in the 1970s, World Politics, vol. 24, no. 2 (January 1972), pp. 159-181; and Keohane and Nye, Power and 




(1) Liberals generally hold an optimistic view about human nature.  
Although humans are self-interested and competitive up to a point, 
they also share many interests and can thus arrive at mutually 
beneficial cooperation. Conflict and war are not inevitable. 
(2) Both the individual and collectives of individuals are focuses of 
liberalist analyses.  The aims of the state, as do the aims of the 
individual, go beyond security to the protection and promotion of 
individual rights.36  But the prime directive of state behaviour is to 
meet the economic and social needs of individuals.37  The state 
must always be the servant of the collective will. 
(3) Although states live under international anarchy, meaning the 
absence of a global government, they do not experience a general 
state of war.38  The process of modernization enlarges the scope 
for cooperation across international boundaries and increases the 
level of interdependence between states. 
(4) Liberals believe that international institutions can achieve the 
desired ends of global welfare and peace.  Institutions alleviate 
                                                
36 Michael W. Doyle, The Ways of War and Peace (New York: Norton Publishers, 1997), p. 211. 
37 John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
p. 64. 
38 Doyle, op. cit., p. 211. 
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problems concerning lack of communication and trust between 
states and thus they reduce states fear of each other. 
 
With the development of regional cooperation and the increasing 
importance of international institutions, liberalism has gained salience among 
international relations experts.  But liberalism is also not a perfect explanatory 
tool.  Economic interdependence that is emphasized in liberalism is not new and 
in the past it has done little to prevent wars between states.  One classic example 
is the relationship between Britain and Germany on the eve of World War I, 
when economic ties were more extensive and significant than at any time 
before or since.39  But this interdependence failed to prevent Germany from 
pursuing an expansionist policy that eventually led to war.  Moreover, the 
principle of free trade enunciated by liberals is often non-reciprocal and used as 
a tool by leading actors to regulate the economic development of subordinate 
societies.  This tendency, together with fundamental changes to the structure of 
the world economy and the forms of international trade, casts some doubt on the 
extent to which liberals can explain the globalisation of the world economy 
solely on their own terms.40 
 
                                                
39 Papayoanou, Paul A., Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and 
World War I, International Security, vol. 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), p. 42. 
40 For an elaborate assessment of the principles of free trade, see Scott Burchill, Liberalism, in Scott 




To study Chinas regional security strategy and its ARF policy, this thesis adopts 
the realist approach for two reasons.  First, realism is an appropriate tool for 
analysing the security issues among sovereign states in an international anarchy, 
which this study is concerned with.  Also, realisms emphasis on national 
interest is the most powerful explanation of the motive of sovereign states 
diplomatic activities, which is the focus of this thesis.  Chinas attitude towards 
the ARF as a multilateral mechanism is the outcome of calculations based on its 
national interest.  For instance, Chinas initial reluctance to participate in the 
ARF was due to its fear of being constrained by the multilateral framework and 
as a result, losing the advantage that it had vis-à-vis individual ASEAN member 
states.  After all, compared to ASEAN states, China is a big power and stands to 
benefit on a bilateral basis compared to a framework based on multilateralism.  
But China also feared that its absence could result in the ARF adopting policies 
that could seriously undermine Chinas interests.  Hence, a better choice was to 
become a member of the institution and influence its decisions from inside. 
 
Second, from the beginning, the idea of the ARF itself was based on realist 
premises.    As noted earlier, realists argue that there is an international hierarchy 
of power among states, and small powers seek to align with others when faced 
against threats from large powers.  ASEAN is composed of relatively weak 
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states that are not confident of their capabilities of maintaining regional security.  
Thus, by applying the realist principle of balance of power, ASEAN hopes to 
maintain a peaceful and stable regional order.  This arrangement would 
encourage a continued U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, also allow Japan to play 
a limited role on security issues and encourage China to behave according to 
those norms that had consistently served the general interests of the ASEAN 
states.41 
 
Methodology and Data Collection 
 
This thesis adopts case study and content analysis approaches within a 
qualitative framework.  It takes Chinas behaviour in the ARF as its case study.  
Chinas behaviour in every ARF meeting will be carefully examined and so will 
be relevant background and particular events related to Chinas such behaviour 
at the ARF meetings.  Moreover, it will also discuss how each ARF meeting 
evaluates Chinas role in regional security environment.  Such evaluations 
demonstrate regional states attitudes towards China and they are also important 
evidence of Chinas shifting security strategy. 
 
                                                
41 Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 19. 
24
 
Apart from the change in its attitudes towards the ARF, China has also 
changed its strategy in other regional and global forums and organizations.  This 
thesis also discusses these changes as comparison to Chinas changes in its ARF 
policy so as to reinforce the argument raised earlier to help readers understand 
better Chinas evolving security strategy. 
 
Materials and data are mainly collected from: (1) Academic publications, 
scholarly journals and other research papers, which help to provide valuable 
insights to the topic and lay the framework for this study.  (2) Governmental 
publications, official documents and newspapers, which help to support the 
arguments of this study.  (3) Some specialized websites, which provide detailed 




This introductory chapter precedes four other chapters in this thesis. 
 
Chapter 1 provides a historical background of the ARFs formation.  The 
end of the Cold War has brought about great changes in the structure of 
international relations.  The ARF was initiated against this background.  The 
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motivations of countries to participate in the ARF are different, with China 
having its own considerations.  These will be explored in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces Chinas historical experience with multilateralism and 
explores its behaviours at the ARF.  Its initial reservation towards the ARF and 
its subsequent changes in attitude will also be discussed.  The reasons for these 
changes are examined.  For China, acquiring the means to manoeuvre the ARF 
to Beijings advantage and influence the ARFs policies from the inside is 
considered a more palatable option than being isolated in the region. 
 
Chapter 3 provides an in-depth explanation of Chinas regional security 
policy in relation to its grand strategy.  The change in Chinas attitude towards 
the ARF is not an isolated occurrence in Chinese diplomacy.  Such a change is 
also noted in Chinas attitude towards other international organizations.  The 
reasons are examined, which include Chinas strategic consideration in its 
policies towards the United States, Japan and ASEAN. 
 
The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of previous chapters.  It 
emphasizes that economic development is Chinas top priority and that its 
security strategy is tuned accordingly in pursuit of this goal.  As for the 
application of international relations theories to explain Chinas security 
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strategy, the explanations of realism and liberalism are highlighted.  It also 
suggests the adoption of a new theoretical framework for explaining Chinas 
security strategy.  Finally, the study concludes by listing some essential factors 
that will influence Chinas security strategy and its role in the Asia-Pacific 




The Formation of the ARF 
 
To assess Chinas behaviours in the ARF, it is necessary to study the formation 
of the ARF, which is a process that reflects security concerns of regional states 
and the development of regional security cooperation after the Cold War.  This 
chapter also analyses the evolving overall strategic environment in the Asia-
Pacific region in the post-Cold War era, among which, the rise of multilateralism 
in the region will be examined as it promoted the establishment of the ARF.  
Finally, this chapter also highlights the security interests of ASEAN, the United 
States and Japan, which played significant roles in the formation of the ARF, 
and their roles and intentions were a major part of Chinas security concerns. 
 
The Regional Security Outlook after the Cold War 
 
The launching of the ARF in July 1994 represented a significant structural 
adjustment to the post-Cold War security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.  
Thus, when exploring the ARFs emergence, it is necessary to analyse the 
regional security context in Asia-Pacific after the end of the Cold War. 
 
First, as a result of the end of the Cold War, a new quadrilateral relationship 
28
 
involving the United States, Russia, Japan and China came to dominate Asian 
security affairs in the early 1990s, instead of the triangular relationships between 
the Soviet Union, the United States and China.  Due to the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the United States emerged as the sole superpower in the world and 
it attempted to play the leading role in the Asia-Pacific region.  However, Russia, 
as the principal successor of the Soviet Union, continued to be influential in 
regional political-military affairs.  At that time, Japan, as the second biggest 
global economy, had great influence in the economic development of East Asia.  
Based on its economic power, Japan also attempted to gain more political 
influence on regional affairs.  With further reforms and opening to the outside 
world, China improved its comprehensive national power greatly and played a 
more important role in the Asian-Pacific region.  The four major powers exerted 
dominant influence on regional affairs during the immediate period after the 
Cold War. 
 
Second, as the old alliances of the Cold War era were fast disappearing, new 
Asia-wide security systems did not emerge in time to fill the vacuum.  Various 
powers were in the process of regrouping with new structures set to emerge.  But 
no single power had taken the leadership in the reconstruction of the regional 
security system.  Though the United States was the only superpower left, its 
domestic difficulties had become more prominent, thus distracting its overseas 
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attention and forcing it to look inward.42  Furthermore, the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the eruption of the Gulf War attracted 
international attention from Asian affairs.  Thus, the United States did not put 
Asia on its priority.  Russia was obsessed with its domestic problems, especially 
its difficult transformation from a command economy to a free market economy.  
Daily necessities became scarce with the prices skyrocketed, making life 
difficult for many Russians.  Hence, Russia had to focus on its internal problems 
with little attention on Asian affairs.  Although Japan was strong economically, 
the history of its invasion of other countries and its defeat in World War II 
remained to be high hurdles for its political expansion, let alone playing a 
leading role in the formation of the new security structure of Asia Pacific.  As for 
China, faced with the economic sanctions from the West because of the 
Tiananmen incident of 1989, it adopted a new strategy of Juebu Dangtou [never 
become the leader].43 
 
Third, in the immediate post-Cold War era, some old conflicts remained 
while new regional tensions emerged.  Several issues leftover by the Cold War 
still threatened the regional security in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the 
situation in the Korean Peninsula, unresolved territorial and maritime disputes, 
                                                
42 For detailed discussion, see Chen Qimao, New Approaches in Chinas Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold 
War Era, Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 3 (March 1993), pp. 239-240. 
43 Zhao Quansheng, Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, World Affairs, vol. 159, no. 3 
(Winter 1997), p. 114. 
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the Taiwan issue, nuclear proliferation, and internal insurgencies.  At the same 
time, new regional security concerns started to emerge, which included the 
increased defence spending, and acquisition of advanced weapons by many 
Southeast Asian countries, to improve their military strength in the light of 
various uncertainties in the regional security environment.  The United States 
began scaling down its military presence in East Asia and its security umbrella 
could no longer be taken for granted.  Chinas rise and Japans bid to be a strong 
political power also concerned Southeast Asian countries.  Finally, the strong 
economic growth in East Asia prior to the 1997 economic crisis made a regional 
arm race tenable.  Other regional concerns included the reconstruction of 
Cambodia, constructive engagement of Myanmar, the extended maritime 
jurisdictions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and 
some non-traditional security issues such as drug trafficking, illegal migration 
and environmental degradation. 
 
Thus, the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War 
pressed countries in the region to seek ways for regional stability and peace.  A 
chaotic and turbulent East Asia was not in the interest of any regional country or 





The Rise of Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
Multilateralism is the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of 
three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions.44  
With diverse implications for the nature of cooperation amongst member states, 
multilateralism exists in great varieties.  Based on the pattern of inter-state 
relations and the degree of institutionalisation, there are four types of 
multilateralism: hegemonic cooperation, guided dialogue cooperation, concert-
type cooperation, and open dialogue cooperation.45 
 
Hegemonic cooperation defines a kind of multilateralism that is dominated 
by a hegemonic state that possesses sufficient power to accord a place to other 
states within the framework, determine the mode of interaction amongst states, 
and impose the distribution of the costs and benefits upon other states.46  The 
hegemonic power manages this type of multilateral arrangement for its own 
interest and purposes.  The Warsaw Pact dominated by the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War and the U.S.-dominated North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) fall into this category. 
                                                
44 Robert Keohane, Multilateralism: an Agenda for Research, International Journal, vol. 45, no. 4 (1990), 
p. 731. 
45 Jörn Dosch, Asia-Pacific multilateralism and the role of the United States, in Jörn Dosch and Manfred 
Mols (eds.), International Relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest and Cooperation 
(New York: LIT and St Martins Press, 2001), p. 89. 
46 Ibid., p. 91.  Also see David Kang, Hierarchy and stability in Asian international relations, in G. John 
Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: 




Guided dialogue cooperation refers to multilateralism that is usually under 
the leadership of a great power.  The degree of domination by the great power is 
less than under hegemonic cooperation.  Nevertheless, the great power or 
hegemon may instigate guided cooperation dialogue in order to deepen its 
influence over a group of major and small powers in a region.  Usually, 
interaction is mediated via relatively tight diplomatic dialogue between the great 
power and others.  Although it involves some elements of hegemonic 
cooperation too, the overall design of governmental interaction in the West 
approaches this type of guided dialogue diplomacy.  For example, Pan-
Americanism that was born out of the Washington Conference (October 1889  
April 1890) and materialized in the Organization of American States and the Rio 
Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed on 2 September 
1947), U.S. President Woodrow Wilsons concept of the League of Nations, and 
the early process of European community-building initiated and managed by 
France and Germany fall into this category.47 
 
Concert-type cooperation refers to the multilateralism that has a group of 
states assuming relatively equal distribution of responsibilities for organizing the 
cooperative framework and its operations.  The Concert of Europe in the 
                                                
47 Dosch, op. cit., p. 92. 
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nineteenth century is an example.  At present, there is a broad range of 
cooperation schemes aspiring to this format, such as the Group of Eight and the 
reign of the permanent members in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. 
 
Open dialogue cooperation describes a type of multilateralism under which 
member states do not have hierarchical relationship and assume launching more 
informal regulations and soft institutions than the other three types.  It is the 
most broadly or loosely defined category of multilateral arrangement.  The Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the ARF fit the type of this framework.48 
 
This typology provides a conceptual tool for exploring more effectively the 
conventional claims concerning the development of multilateralism in the Asia-
Pacific region.  With this categorization, we can better understand how the end 
of the Cold War has influenced Asian countries attitudes towards multilateral 
cooperation. 
 
During the Cold War there were few meaningful multilateral security 
frameworks in Asia Pacific.  This was due to the U.S. policy preferences in the 
region and the regional strategic diversity.  Aimed at containing the Soviet Union 
                                                
48 For detailed explanation, see Dosch, op. cit., p. 93, pp. 98-99. 
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and China, the U.S. regional strategy focused heavily on forging security 
arrangements with a collective defence function, rather than inclusive 
organizations geared to the pacific settlement of intra-regional conflicts.  The 
multilateral scheme was not perceived necessary by the United States since it 
was the strongest Pacific power and dominant global institution-builder.  Thus, 
most alliances that the United States built during that period were bilateral in 
nature.  Although there were some U.S. attempts to establish multilateral security 
mechanisms, they were finally thwarted by the sheer diversity of security 
challenges (such as the salience of internal security concerns in Southeast Asia 
versus the more direct Soviet and Chinese threat in Northeast Asia) facing the 
regions pro-Western countries. 49   The only successful multilateral security 
framework, and one not overtly designed for this purpose originally, was 
ASEAN.  Because it did not want to provoke its Indochinas adversaries, 
ASEAN downplayed its security functions during the period of Cold War. 
 
As the Cold War ended, multilateralism began to attract greater attention 
from the regional states for the following five reasons:  First of all, the end of 
the Cold War left the Asia Pacific with a window of strategic opportunity for 
multilateral institution building. 
                                                
49 Amitav Acharya, Making Multilateralism Work: The ASEAN Regional Forum and Security in the Asia-
Pacific, in Amitav Acharya, Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperation Security in the Asia-




Secondly, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States lost 
ideological justification for its crusading abroad while its economic difficulties 
at home constrained its military expenditure.  Although the actual U.S. military 
retrenchment was not significant, there continued to be a general perception of 
the relative decline of the United States in a regional security milieu marked by 
the rise of several competing centres of power.  The fact that the U.S. security 
umbrella could no longer be taken for granted fuelled a search for alternative 
security strategies. 50   Thus, multilateralism rose as a necessary insurance 
policy by regional states with anticipation of a steady decline in the U.S. 
regional military presence. 
 
Thirdly, the end of East-West confrontation brought about the decline of 
ideology as a factor in international relations and economic development 
emerged as the principal preoccupation of nearly all states whether developed or 
developing.  Thus, the world became more interdependent, due to a combination 
of high technology, rapid communications, lower tariff barriers, and the 
economic leadership and tolerance of the United States.51  No region, including 
Asia Pacific, could escape this global trend.  The growing economic 
                                                
50 Ibid., p. 187. 
51 Thomas W. Robinson, Chinese Foreign Policy During and After the Cold War, in Jane Shapiro Zacek 




interdependence between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia also greatly 
contributed to the perceived need for multilateralism. 
 
Fourthly, after the Cold War, major regional adversaries were searching for a 
common ground to bury the old hatchet.  Multilateralism provided a desirable 
long-term alternative for realizing regional rapprochement.  Also, regional 
security had become more indivisible than ever before since developments in 
one segment of the region could seriously affect the security of the other.  There 
were a few problems such as the territorial disputes in the South China Sea 
transcending sub-regional dimensions.  In view of this, bilateral and sub-regional 
approaches were deemed inadequate for ensuring regional stability. 
 
Finally, the successful experience of multilateral cooperation in Europe, 
notably the CSCE enhanced the confidence of establishing a similar framework 
in the Asia-Pacific region.  It provided the initial impetus for multilateral 
mechanisms in Asia, such as an Asia-Pacific Conference for Security and 




                                                
52 Dosch, op. cit., p. 95. 
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The Formation of the ARF 
 
The end of the Cold War removed the overlay of superpower rivalry and 
presented regional states with opportunities to shape a new regional order.  From 
the outset, there was common interest among the regional states and other 
relevant powers in developing regional security mechanisms.  At the same time, 
regional policy-makers and scholars pointed out that traditional bilateral security 
arrangements were insufficient to address the pressure arising from increasing 
regional interdependence as well as to cope with the uncertain security 
environment in East Asia.  Thus, there came the urgent need for establishing a 
multilateral framework for security cooperation, especially for the small states in 
Southeast Asia, which felt threatened by the security uncertainty. 
 
Actually, there were already several calls for the establishment of a 
multilateral security mechanism to reduce superpower competition in Northeast 
Asia during the final stages of the Cold War.  In 1986, the former Soviet Union 
(under Mikhail Gorbachev) called for a Pacific Ocean conference along the 
lines of the Helsinki conference53 based on the CSCE model to discuss peace 
and security in the region.  Three years later, Foreign Minster Gareth Evans of 
Australia described a future Asian security architecture involving wholly new 
                                                
53 Trevor Findlay, Asia/Pacific CSBMS: A Prospectus, Working Paper no. 90 (Canberra: Peace Research 
Centre, Australian National University), p. 16. 
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institutional processes that might be capable of evolving in Asia just as in 
Europe, as a framework for addressing and resolving security problems.54  At 
the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC) meetings in 1990, Canadian 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, proposed a cooperative 
security model of multilateralism and called for the establishment of North 
Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue (NPCSD).  The proposal emphasized the 
retention of bilateral security arrangements while encouraging a gradual process 
of confidence building and dialogue.55  But these proposals were not accepted.  
The United States regarded these proposals as undermining American naval 
predominance in Asia Pacific and weakening the U.S. bilateral security 
arrangements.  Richard Solomon, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, directly addressed the doubts about the utility of a 
Helsinki-type institution for enhancing security or promoting conflict 
resolution.56  Other Asia-Pacific countries responded coolly to these proposals as 
the ideas were conceived by those states situated on the periphery of the Asia-
Pacific region. 57   They also questioned the utility of such a mechanism.  
Moreover, these proposals drew heavily from the European experience.  The 
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55 Amitav Acharya, ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Multilateralism: Managing Regional Security, in Amitav 
Acharya and Richard Stubbs (eds.), New Challenges for ASEAN: Emerging Policy Issues (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1995), p. 185. 
56 Richard Solomon reiterated the principal elements of the U.S. Asian strategy, which included forward 
deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements.  He stressed that the U.S. alliance 
network would remain valid and essential to deal with the security challenges of the post-Cold War era.  For 
more details, see Richard Solomon, Asian Security in the 1990s: Integration in Economics, Diversity in 
Defence, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 1, no. 10 (5 November 1990). 
57 Simon J. Hay, ASEANs Regional Security Dialogue Process: From Expectation to Reality? (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), p. 9. 
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direct applicability of the European model, implemented in a largely 
homogeneous Europe, to the politically, economically and culturally diverse 
Asia Pacific was considered a questionable venture. 
 
Although these proposals failed to win immediate acceptance, they did 
succeed in contributing to the debate about the need for a new post-Cold War 
security structure in Asia Pacific, catalysing the change in regional attitudes 
towards security cooperation, and paving the way for the birth of the ARF. 
 
It was under these circumstances that steps towards the formation of the ARF 
were gradually made.  In 1990, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and 
International Studies proposed to use the ASEAN-PMC as a forum for a regional 
security dialogue.  At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1991, this 
proposal was discussed but no consensus was reached among ASEAN foreign 
ministers on the need for a regional security dialogue.58  However, following the 
U.S. announcement in November 1991 of its forthcoming withdrawal from the 
Philippines and the Soviet Unions collapse in December, the ASEAN states 
agreed to address security matters through the ASEAN-PMC at the fourth 
ASEAN summit in January 1992.59   After the 25th AMM in July 1992, the 
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ASEAN-PMC began to discuss regional security matters on regular basis.  Due 
to the tense situation in the South China Sea and the closure of the U.S. bases in 
the Philippines by the end of 1992, the ASEAN states felt the increasing urgency 
to launch a new multilateral security forum to include non-PMC members.  In 
May 1993, the first ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (ASEAN-SOM) for the 
PMC was held in Singapore.  The participants agreed on the need to form a 
multilateral process of cooperative security to promote cooperation in the region.  
Notably, the chairmans statement pointed out: The continuing presence of the 
United States, as well as stable relationships among the United States, Japan and 
China, and other states of the region would contribute to regional stability.60  
This reflected ASEANs intention to balance big powers in the forthcoming 
establishment of the ARF.  The senior officials also expressed a willingness to 
engage China and other non-PMC members within an extended security 
dialogue, which led to the decision to invite the foreign ministers of China, 
Russia, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea to a special session in Singapore 
in July 1993. 
 
On 25 July 1993, the special session, which in effect was the inaugural 
meeting of the ARF, was held in Singapore, and attended by foreign ministers 
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from eighteen countries.  The three-hour meeting was deliberately left informal 
and unstructured, based on the belief that a relaxed style would get the new 
grouping off to a good start and make all participants comfortable with the idea 
of talking about security issues.  Indeed, the mere gathering of so many states, 
including those who may see each other as potential rivals such as the United 
States, China, Japan, and Vietnam, was itself a great achievement, let alone 
discussing the sensitive security issues among them.  The substantial outcome of 
this meeting was the agreement that the Forums first meeting would be held in 
Bangkok the next year. 
 
The first official meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994, 
participated by the foreign ministers of ASEAN states, ASEAN's dialogue 
partners, consultative partners, and observers or their representatives. 61   The 
meeting endorsed the purposes and principles of ASEANS Treaty of Amity and 
Co-operation in Southeast Asia as a code of conduct governing regional relations 
between states.  As the Chairmans Statement declared, being the first time ever 
that high-ranking representatives from the majority of states in the Asia-Pacific 
region came to specifically discuss political and security cooperation issues, the 
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Meeting was considered a historic event for the region.62  It was agreed that the 
Forum would meet annually. 
 
Security Interests behind the ARF 
 
From a realist viewpoint, the establishment of the ARF was a power-based 
process.  In this interactive process, ASEAN, a grouping of small powers, played 
the initiating and central role.  Other participants, such as the United States, 
Japan and China, also played an important role in the ARFs formation.  Their 
policies, as discussed below, also greatly influenced the development of the ARF. 
 
The core objective of ASEAN in initiating the ARF was to engage the 
United States, Japan and China in a structure of multilateral dialogue in order to 
promote a stable distribution of power in the Asia-Pacific.63  This aim was 
based on their assessment of the changed security situation after the Cold War.  
Previously, ASEAN was very sensitive and cautious about multilateral security 
cooperation.  The change of ASEANs attitude was formally signalled by the 
Singapore Declaration of 1992.  In January, at the end of its fourth Summit, 
ASEAN declared its interest in engaging in security cooperation with other 
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external powers and stated: ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in 
political and security matters by using the ASEAN-PMC.64  It should be noted 
that before this Summit the formal process of ASEAN-PMC dialogue had long 
confined to issues of economic cooperation. 
 
What led to this change of ASEANs attitude towards multilateral security 
cooperation?  First of all, post-Cold War security challenges made ASEAN states 
concerned about the changing balance of power and reassess their approach to 
regional security.  Secondly, ASEAN was aware of the limitation of weak power 
politics and realized that in order to avoid being ignored by the great powers, it 
must ensure its place as primus inter pares (first among equals) in that 
architecture.65  Thirdly, ASEAN hoped to preserve its post-Cold War relevance 
and consolidate its diplomatic position.  Through the creation of new multilateral 
structure, ASEAN tried to develop, or further define, its stabilizing role in 
Southeast Asian affairs.  The idea that the collective weak can win over the 
individual strong may not be a wishful thinking of the ASEAN.  Actually, 
ASEAN seeking the leading position in the ARF, to a large extent, did reflect its 
desire for a new security role in the post-Cold War period. 
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The United States, usually preferring bilateral arrangements to manage 
regional security, began to change its policy towards multilateralism and became 
more constructive from the later stages of the First Bush administration.  It 
began to support some flexible and ad hoc multilateral efforts in dealing with 
specific security issues.66  The Clinton administration went further in expressing 
support for the scheme.  In July 1994, the Clinton administration defined its own 
national security strategy as one of engagement and enlargement.  One important 
facet of that policy was an explicit call for a policy that facilitated regional 
integration.  The rationale for fostering such regional integration was that nations 
that would work together in the absence of the United States might be willing to 
coalesce around the United States in a crisis.67  Moreover, there was also another 
factor leading to the shift of the U.S. policy.  This was a realization that 
regional countries viewed multilateralism not as a substitute for U.S. military 
supremacy and its bilateral alliances but as a necessary complement to the latter 
at a time of a rapidly changing regional balance of power.68 
 
Japan played an active role in the formation of the ARF.  In Japans view, 
without undermining the existing security arrangements like the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, the ARF was a vehicle to foster a sense of trust, however fragile, on the 
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basis of providing and sharing quality information about China, Japan, and the 
United States. 69   As early as July 1991, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama 
proposed a multilateral security dialogue within the ASEAN-PMC framework, 
though it was rejected by ASEAN due to its fears of a more assertive Japan.  
However, as its foreign policy emphasized the flexible application of multiplex 
mechanisms 70  based on the conception of comprehensive security, Japan 
continued to advocate developing multilateral security mechanisms in Asia 
Pacific.  Its motivation was to seek a greater political role in the formation of a 
new regional order, and the ARF might serve as a legitimising vehicle for it to 
expand its political and security influence. 
 
What were Chinas motivations in participating in the ARF?  How did it 
behave in the ARF?  What were the changes in Chinas position?  These 
questions will be dealt with in the following chapter. 
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China and the ARF: Policy and Behaviour 
 
This chapter studies Chinas participation of the ARF.  It looks into Chinas 
historical experience with multilateral organizations, which had greatly 
influenced its perception and approach to regional security institutions.  It also 
analyses Chinas motivations for joining the ARF.  Finally, Chinas behaviours 
in the eleven ARF meetings (1994-2004) and motivations will be examined. 
 
Chinas Historical Experience with Multilateralism 
 
Chinas initial attitudes towards the ARF were consistent with its traditional 
aversion towards multilateralism.  China had an early and miserable experience 
with multilateralism since the early 1930s when the League of Nations 
acquiesced to Japans invasion of Chinas Manchuria.  During the Cold War 
period, international organizations such as the United Nations (before October 
1971 when the UN General Assembly accepted the PRC to represent China at 
the United Nations) and regional groupings such as Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) and ASEAN were perceived by China as being directed 
against it.  The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also perceived the Soviet 
Union as attempting to control it through the guises of the Communist 
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International in the 1940s and the Soviet-controlled Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance in the 1950s.  For a long time after 1949, China was 
excluded from the United Nations and other international organizations.  These 
experiences led to its belief that the West was using multilateral institutions to 
form blocs to thwart its legitimate interests.  In other words, China perceived 
itself as a target or a victim rather than a participant in multilateralism.  Even 
when it championed for the Third World issues, it never became a member of 
the Group of Seventy-Seven or the Non-Aligned Movement. 
 
Chinas hesitation on multilateral security cooperation was also accounted 
by its two concerns.  The first was its concern of internationalisation of both 
the Taiwan issue and the issue of the South China Sea, where China has 
territorial disputes with some ASEAN states.  The second was its concern over 
the role and intention of the United States in any multilateral security 
arrangement in Asia Pacific.  China believed that the United States would try to 
lead and dominate such arrangements.  It is no surprise that China was 
suspicious of the ARF at first, and perceived the forum as a potential ploy by the 






Chinas Motivations for Participating in the ARF 
 
Notwithstanding its distrust, China joined the ARF in 1994.  What then, were its 
motivations?  The fact that ASEAN was the initiator made it possible for China 
to agree to join in since any suggestion by other major powers, such as the 
United States, Russia or Japan, would have met immediate Chinese reluctance 
and even resistance as nothing more than an instrument of containing China.71  
As the ARF was based on ASEAN principles, China could safely rely on support 
from the ASEAN countries to exclude debates on human rights and other 
sensitive political issues from the agenda.  Furthermore, conflicting issues would 
not be discussed publicly and every participant would strictly respect the 
principle of non-intervention in other participants domestic affairs, a basic 
principle that met the request from Chinas. 
 
Also, China was aware of the shift in the power structure in the Asia-Pacific 
region after the Cold War.  As early as in 1991, it realized that the triangular 
relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China was 
evolving into a quadrilateral relationship between the United States, Russia, 
China, and Japan.  The interactions among the four major players and the critical 
role played by the diplomatically shrewd ASEAN states culminated in the 
                                                




formation of a multi-layered political, economic, and military structure in the 
region.  A careful handling of this multi-layered relationship was of crucial 
importance to the establishment of a new political and economic order in the 
Asia Pacific.72  Following closely after the Tiananmen Square incident, Chinas 
participation in the ARF also rested on the consideration that Beijing did not 
want to provide the United States with an opportunity to influence other 
countries to levy trade sanctions against China for its human rights record.73  
With the concern of the strengthened U.S. bilateral diplomacy in the region, 
China calculated that it would be more beneficial to stay engaged with, even if 
only selectively, than to decouple itself totally from the ARF, since by so doing, 
China could at least exert some measure of influence and act proactively to head 
off potential troubles. 
 
Another reason for Chinas participation in the ARF was that joining such a 
cooperative Forum would help to fight off the international fear of Chinas 
aspirations to regional hegemonism.74  As a scholar noted:“ endorsement and 
participation in multilateral security could be a more effective means to dispel 
the perception of a China threat than frequent reiteration of the pledge that 
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China will not seek hegemony in the region.75  Chinese President Jiang Zemin 
had tried to reassure that Chinas peace-oriented foreign policy was not an 
expedient move but an inevitable choice made in line with the times and in view 
of the long-term interests of the people of China. 76   In short, Chinas 
participation, as opposed to abstention, would further reassure regional states of 
Beijings peaceful intentions based on the desire for continued stability to 
support its economic modernization drive at home.  Based on these 
considerations, China joined as a consultative partner in the ARF. 
 
Chinas Reactive Behaviour as a Consultative Partner 
 
The First ARF Meeting 
In 1994, China joined the first ARF meeting as a consultative partner, which 
would not decide the working pattern of the ARF, but was nevertheless 
indicative of Chinas strong interest to participate in the Forum. 
 
The ARF Chairmans statement, released at the end of the first working 
session, pointed out that the participants recognized developments in one part 
of the region could have an impact on the security of the region as a whole,77 
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and this recognition strengthened their commitment to the ARF.  But to China, 
this concept of security interdependence was relatively new at this stage.  
Therefore, Chinas acceptance of this concept marked a break in its thinking, and 
it now conceded that events in China would affect the rest of the world and vice 
versa.  This admission of security interdependence gave substance to the mutual 
cooperation of regional stability. 
 
Another concession by China was its endorsement of ASEANs Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC).  This was a stark departure from Chinas past 
reluctance to do so.  The Treaty provides conflict prevention mechanisms that 
may, under certain circumstances, be invoked to apply to the South China Sea 
disputes.  Similarly, China expressed support for the 1992 Manila Declaration on 
the South China Sea after its initial reservations.  Also during the meeting, 
Chinas Foreign Minister Qian Qichen extended an invitation to ASEAN 
countries to discuss regional issues in Beijing in April 1995. 78   He also 
reportedly told a group of journalists after the meeting that China was prepared 
to engage in defence cooperation with its neighbours, although the nature of 
such cooperation was unspecified.79 
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However, China was unwilling to go too far.  Even after the creation of the 
ARF, China remained hesitant and defensive about further development of the 
multilateral security institution.  It was not a particularly pro-active consultative 
partner at the time, but rather tried to justify omitting a number of ideas for 
further study at the next working session.  This reluctance towards a stronger 
institutionalisation of the Forum led to a much weaker form of cooperation based 
on working groups with second-track personnel.  Owing to Chinas objection, 
the term security dilemma was not used in the memorandum.  Agreements on 
a regional weapons registration system and a treaty on monitoring troop 
movements along common borders were also cancelled due to Chinas 
resistance.80 
 
China also insisted that the ARF develop in a way that every participant 
should accept its pace of development and outcome.  Although one could argue 
that other Asian countries held somewhat similar positions and only left it to 
China to publicly express it, nevertheless, Chinas reservations were the 
strongest.  For example, as the official Beijing Review commented, concrete 
measures for the solution of specific problems would induce the regional forum 
to leave its track and become uncontrollable. 81   The first ARF Chairmans 
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Statement expressed willingness, including that on Chinas part too, to court 
other internationally recognized alternatives of security cooperation.  However, 
China was initially unwilling to allow the discussion of these ideas at inter-
sessional meetings by government officials, presumably for fear of being tied to 
a process from which it could not back out.  This straightforward opposition 
illustrated its reluctance to even court the unfettered (i.e., free trial without 
obligation) possibility of mutual interest in limited sovereignty. 
 
The conflict over the South China Sea was often quoted as a test case for 
the ARFs capacity.  Just prior to the first ARF meeting, China tried to make 
sure that the territorial dispute about the Spratly islands would not appear on the 
agenda.  At the first ARF Senior Officials Meeting, China strongly opposed any 
attempt to develop tight time schedules for the implementation of security 
measures.  China vetoed against discussing the Spratly issue at the ARF, and 
argued that an internationalisation of the issue would open doors for third parties 
to intervene and draw advantages of their own.82 
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The Second ARF Meeting 
The second ARF meeting in March 1995 set out the long-term objectives in its 
Concept Paper.  The Paper describes an ASEANs blueprint for charting the 
course of the ARF.  Without specifying a time frame, it outlines three stages of 
evolution for the ARF as from initial confidence-building, through preventive 
diplomacy, to ultimate conflict-resolution mechanisms.83   An Inter-sessional 
Support Group (ISG) was formed and several Inter-sessional Meetings (ISMs) 
were convened to develop and implement the measures as envisaged by the 
different stages of the Concept Paper.  This was a significant departure from the 
usual ASEANs way, where proceeding in an informal way at a pace 
comfortable to all.  Initially, China objected to the formalization of such a paper, 
but under the institutionally logical pressure that a forum without an agenda had 
no reason to exist, the participating states pushed ahead with the paper under the 
guise of an academic exercise in order that the Forum would not fall at the first 
hurdle.84 
 
At the meeting in Brunei in August 1995, the ARF Chairmans Statement 
specifically alluded to the ARF goals as to ensure and preserve the current 
environment of peace, prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific  to reduce 
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the risk to security and  recognize that the concept of comprehensive security 
includes not only military aspects but also political, economic, social and other 
issues.85  For its intentions and purposes, the Chairmans Statement reflected 
the three-stage approach that was elaborated in the Concept Paper.  However, 
Stage III, Conflict Resolution Mechanisms (CRMs), did not make it into the 
Chairmans Statement due to Chinas objection since this was an area of possible 
intervention from outside, especially in areas that China considered exclusively 
internal matters of jurisdiction, i.e., issues regarding Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and 
the South China Sea. 
 
At this meeting, China, for the first time, expressed its willingness to 
discuss the Spratly issue multilaterally.  But this discussion was open only to 
ASEAN countries, and not within the ARF.  However, the spokesman from 
Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs later stated that the islands sovereignty 
would be unimpeachable and the best way for conflict resolution would be to 
rely on bilateral negotiations. 86   The Spratly issue was Chinas dilemma in 
multilateral cooperation in the field of security policies.  On the one hand, China 
tried to react to other ARF members pressure for compromise, while it was, on 
the other hand, unwilling to concede on its own national interests.  In order to 
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prevent further isolation, China took a conciliatory position.  This is because, as 
one ASEAN scholar noted, for China, the political costs of defection from a 
multilateral security forum like the ARF have begun to outweigh the strategic 
benefits accruing from an uncompromising territorial posture.87 
 
At the 1995 ARF meeting, the formalization of its goals and approaches 
managed to draw China further into the ARF process and thus into deeper 
regional and global forms of cooperation and dialogues.  The inclusion of 
defence officers at this ARF meeting signified the importance assigned to the 
ARF by participating countries, especially in a region where foreign affairs were 
often bypassed by defence departments.  Therefore, China could not ignore the 
huge impact of the ARF on regional affairs. 
 
Nevertheless, at the 1995 ARF meeting, China also tried to slow down the 
potential reckless pace of the ARF towards institutionalisation 88  through 
formal mechanisms and sessional groups.  It preferred that the ARF remained an 
informal dialogue mechanism rather than a formal security organization.  It had 
no interest in seeing the ARF become an arbitrator of regional conflict.89 
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At the first two ARF meetings, China appeared to have made concessions 
on the issue of security cooperation, as it was on paper, but China did not 
actively promote regional security cooperation and it, on most occasions, only 
reacted to various security cooperation initiatives. 
 
Chinas Proactive Behaviour as a Full Dialogue Partner 
 
In March 1996, in a letter to Ali Alatas, Chairman of ASEAN Standing 
Committee and Indonesias Foreign Minister at the time, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen indicated in clear terms Chinas intention to become 
ASEANs full dialogue partner. ASEAN responded positively on 24 June, when 
Alatas notified Qian in a letter about a consensus among ASEAN foreign 
ministers to upgrade China into a full dialogue partner.  In July 1996, China 
attended the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as a full dialogue partner for the first 
time, 90  which held out a great opportunity for bilateral friendship and 
cooperation.  At this meeting, China, for the first time, proposed that to 
establish a China-ASEAN partnership of good-neighbourliness and mutual trust, 
a partnership oriented towards the 21st century, should be the common objective 
for all of us. 91   Accordingly, this upgrading marked Chinas greater 
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participation in the ARF process and more proactive attitude towards regional 
security cooperation. 
 
The Third ARF Meeting 
At the third ARF meeting in Jakarta in July 1996, Chinas Foreign Minister Qian 
suggested that the ARF should start a dialogue on defence conversion and began 
discussions on comprehensive security cooperation. 92   In terms of military 
cooperation, he offered several proposals on confidence building, such as 
notifying and inviting other ARF members to observe joint military exercises, 
and reducing to eventually eliminating military reconnaissance targeted at 
certain members of the Forum.  Together with the agreement signed between 
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in April 1996, which 
included a series of military confidence-building measures along the border 
areas, Chinas actions reflected its new thinking of security cooperation.  This 
new thinking was reflected in the new security concept raised by Qian at the 
same ARF meeting.  What is noteworthy is that this was the first time that the 
Chinese government introduced the new security concept in the international 
community.  China also agreed to co-sponsor with the Philippines the 1997 
meeting on confidence-building measures in Beijing, which was the first official 
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multilateral conference on security held by China.  The voluntary acceptance to 
organize this conference was a clear indication of progress in Chinas attitude 
towards multilateral cooperation. 
 
The Fourth ARF Meeting 
At the fourth ARF meeting in Malaysia on 27 July 1997, China continued to 
increase its involvement in the multilateral security cooperation though not 
substantially in CRMs.  The meeting went into some depth on the Track I and 
Track II activities of various ISGs and ISMs reflecting the advances that had 
been made in these areas.  In his speech, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 
confirmed the ARFs importance as a channel for regional security discussions 
and its contribution to building confidence and promoting peace and stability in 
Asia Pacific.93  He emphasized that the ARF should not be established with the 
intention to defuse a common threat, but rather to achieve a common goal, which 
was peace and stability.  Qian described the cooperation style of the Forum as 
equal participation, consensus-making, seeking common ground while shelving 
differences, and incremental progress.94  About the issue of enhancing the role of 
the Chair, Qian noted that it was a useful measure for building confidence and 
that the Chair could mediate in the disputes during the meeting.  However, he 
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94 Ibid., p. 909. 
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pointed out that the conditions were not ripe for the Chairman to coordinate 
outside the confines of the ARF meeting.  Regarding the development of the 
Forum, he suggested that it would be better for regional peace and stability to 
continue promoting confidence-building measures, rather than rashly enter the 
next stage of preventive diplomacy.95  Despite its hesitance about moving into 
the next two stages, i.e. preventive diplomacy and CRMs, a significant change 
has occurred in Chinas position: It now agreed to talk about the competing 
claims in the South China Sea at the Forum.  China previously preferred bilateral 
solutions to the dispute and refused to discuss it at the ARF.  This flexibility 
illustrated its willingness to get well with ASEAN states and its sincerity on the 
constructive cooperation with the ARF, which were appreciated by other 
members. 
 
The Fifth ARF Meeting 
The fifth ARF meeting was held against the backdrop of the Asian financial 
crisis that started in July 1997.  China was not totally unaffected by the crisis, 
but had withstood it better than many of its Asian neighbours.  As the World 
Bank noted in the aftermath of the crisis, Chinas growth is one source of 
stability for the region.96  As its neighbours currencies fell in value, China 
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410. 
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promised not to devaluate its currency, Renminbi, and made efforts to help 
stabilize the precarious financial situation.  It made several billion dollars in aid 
to those affected Southeast Asian economies.  This positive response to the 
financial crisis helped its image in the Asia-Pacific region, and its relations with 
Southeast Asian countries improved greatly.  As a result, during the first 
ASEAN-Plus-One Summit between the leaders of ASEAN states and Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, a joint declaration 
was released for establishing a good-neighbourly and mutual-trust partnership 
between China and ASEAN towards the twenty-first century.97  In July 1998, 
China published its white paper on national defence on the same day as the 
reports submission to the ARF meeting.  In the white paper, it elaborated the 
new concept for security cooperation, which included three principles.  First, the 
relations among nations should be established on the basis of the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence; i.e., mutual respect for territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.98  Secondly, in the 
economic field, all countries should strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation, 
open up to each other, eliminate inequalities and discriminatory policies in 
economic and trade relations, gradually reduce the development gaps between 
                                                                                                                              
Crisis (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999), p. 34. 
97 Wang Yong, China, ASEAN Stress Peace: Summit Agrees on Approach, China Daily, 17 December 
1997, p. 1. 
98 White Paper on Chinas National Defence, Information Office of the State Council, Peoples Republic 
of China, 27 July 1998.  http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/wpnatdef.htm 
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countries and seek common prosperity.99  Thirdly, all countries should promote 
mutual understanding and trust through dialogue and cooperation, and seek the 
settlement of divergences and disputes among nations through peaceful 
means.100 
 
At the ARF Ministerial Meeting in 1998, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang 
Jiaxuan further elaborated Chinas new security concept and emphasized the 
mutual security.  He pointed out that the act of creating imaginary enemies or 
fabricating threat directed at a third country would eventually harm others and 
more so oneself.101  Economic security was also mutual, and it was inadvisable 
to try to shift ones troubles onto others.  About the ARFs development, China 
held that it was necessary to lay down the guiding principles for building 
confidence and conducting security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  At the same time, Tang noted: the ARF should continue to make timely 
exploration of the overlapping subject matters of confidence building measures 
and preventive diplomacy as well as the ways and means of addressing them.  
When conditions are ripe, we can probe the theories and approaches of 
preventive diplomacy which are suited to regional features.102  Finally, China 
highlighted its support of ASEANs leadership in the ARF.  Other ARF 
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participants expressed their high appreciation of Chinas efforts in alleviating the 
tension in South Asia due to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, 
and attached great importance to Chinas new security concept.103  Furthermore, 
China was praised for its contribution to regional stability through its agreements 
at the sub-regional level with Russia, and other three Central Asian countries, 
and the agreement with India, both on settling the border demarcation and 
implementing CBMs in the border areas.104 
 
The Sixth ARF Meeting 
The sixth ARF meeting was held in Singapore on 27 July 1999.  In this year, 
China faced several security challenges: the U.S. bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade, quite a few incidents happening in South China Sea,105 
and Lee Teng-huis two states remarks.  Before the ARF meeting, Chinese 
Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine 
K. Albright.  This was the first meeting between the two since the bombing of 
the Chinese Embassy.  Tang pointed out that China-U.S. relationship had been 
seriously damaged by U.S. bombing.  He urged the U.S. side to give full 
recognition to the serious nature of the bombing incident, give serious attention 
                                                
103 Renmin Ribao, 30 July 1998. 
104 See Point 8, in Chairmans Statement of the Fifth Meeting of the ARF, Manila, 27 July 1998.  
http://www.aseansec.org/3595.htm 
105 In June, Malaysia built constructions in the contested water in South China Sea.  In July, a Philippines 
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to the Chinese demands and take practical action to remedy the serious damage 
to the China-U.S. relationship.  Albright said that President Bill Clinton and 
other U.S. officials had repeatedly formally apologized to the Chinese side for 
the bombing and the United States was willing to take practical action to seek a 
proper settlement of the issue so as to return the U.S.-China relations to their 
normal track.  She reaffirmed the U.S. government's commitment to the "one 
China" policy and said Washington would not change this policy. 106   This 
meeting signalled a resumption of China-U.S. bilateral relations. 
 
At the same ARF meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan also 
stated Chinas viewpoints on regional and global security situation and 
emphasized the need for a new approach towards security cooperation.  China 
agreed in principle to accede to the protocol to the treaty on the Southeast Asia 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ), and it would discuss with ASEAN 
about the code of conduct in the South China Sea.107  It also showed willingness 
to join the TAC,108 which requires its signatories not to use force in settling 
disputes in the region.  Chinas positive attitude was welcomed by many ARF 
participants.  Moreover, China, instead of refusing as it used to, agreed to 
discuss the issue and measures of preventive diplomacy and even the issue of 
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conflict resolution, as an eventual goal of the ARF. 109   At the meeting, the 
Ministers attached great importance to the dialogue in the ASEAN-China Senior 
Officials Consultations, the regular exchange of views in the ARF, and the 
continuing work of the Informal Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in 
the South China Sea, which have enhanced confidence building. 110   In an 
interview after the meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan noted that 
the ARF needed to conduct vigorous explorations on new security concepts and 
new security-seeking modalities. 
 
The Seventh ARF Meeting 
The seventh ARF meeting was held in Thailand in July 2000 against the 
background of rapid progress in East Asian cooperation, such as the signing of a 
border treaty between China and Vietnam in December 1999, which solved all 
the remaining land disputes between the two countries,111 and the first summit 
between North and South Koreas in June 2000.112  As a result, North Korea was 
invited and attended the seventh ARF meeting. 
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At the ARF meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan stated Chinas 
position and viewpoints on the situation in the Asia-Pacific region.  He noted 
that, while the economy of East Asia was recovering and East Asian cooperation 
had made notable progress, the Cold-War mentality was still affecting the way 
some countries perceived world politics and international relations, and bilateral 
military alliances were consolidating.113  In particular, he noted that the U.S. 
Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) program in East Asia was against the tide of the 
times, and separatist forces were asserting themselves more aggressively.  On 
the development of the ARF, Tang agreed to consolidate and deepen the 
confidence-building measures and, at the same time, explore and discuss the 
question of preventive diplomacy in the region.  He pointed out that it was 
essential for the Forum to reach a consensus first on the concept and principles 
of preventive diplomacy.114 
 
At the meeting, China also expressed its support in adopting a regional code 
on the conduct of the South China Sea.115  These efforts were appreciated by 
other participants as they also helped to improve the confidence by other 
                                                
113 Full Text of Chinese FMs Speech at the 7th ARF Meeting, Renmin Ribao, 27 July 2000. 
114 Ibid. 




countries on Chinas willingness to play a positive role in regional 
cooperation.116 
 
The Eighth ARF Meeting 
In July 2001, the eighth ARF meeting was held in Vietnam.  Before the meeting, 
China went further in promoting regional cooperation.  In December 2000, 
China and Vietnam signed the agreement on demarcation of territorial waters, 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the Tonkin Gulf.  In January 
2001, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il paid an unofficial visit to China.  In the 
bilateral talks, Chinese President Jiang Zemin expressed Chinas willingness to 
continue to support the active efforts made by both North and South Koreas to 
improve relations for the eventual peaceful reunification.117  In February 2001, 
the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) launched its inaugural conference in China, 
attended by leaders from 25 countries.  BFA was the first non-governmental 
regional forum located in China.  In June, the presidents of China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan jointly issued the declaration 
on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  Thus, 
the SCO, initiated by China and Russia, was formally founded in China.  It was 
to develop a Shanghai Spirit featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, 
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consultation, respect for different civilizations and common prosperity.118  It 
was based on the above-mentioned new security concept as raised by China.  
These positive Chinese actions in international cooperation marked a 
development of Chinas foreign policy from active participation to self-
motivated initiation.  Against this backdrop, China made great efforts in 
promoting regional security cooperation within the framework of the ARF.  In 
September 2000, China hosted the Seminar on Defence Conversion Co-
operation and the fourth Meeting of Heads of Defence College, Universities and 
Institutions.  At the same time, China proposed to establish the ARF Regional 
Maritime Information Centre (ARF-RMIC), a proposal that was accepted by all 
participants. 
 
The most important progress that the eighth ARF meeting made was the 
adoption of three documents: the paper on the concept and principles of 
preventive diplomacy,119 the paper on the enhanced role of ARF Chair120 and the 
                                                
118 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 7 January 2004, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC.  
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119 The paper defined preventive diplomacy as consensual diplomatic and political action taken by 
sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties.  Its objectives are: to prevent 
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69
 
paper on the terms of reference for ARF experts/eminent persons (EEPs).121  
China illustrated its support for the three papers and the development of the 
Forum.  Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan commended the adoption of the 
three documents, which signified an important achievement in the transitional 
process as the Forum moved from confidence-building measures to preventive 
diplomacy.  In view of the growing concern of all sides over non-traditional 
security, he expressed that China was in favour of progressive development of 
dialogue and cooperation by the Forum in the non-traditional security field and 
stood ready to take an active part and play its due role.  China continued to 
support ASEAN to play the leading role at the Forum.  Meanwhile, given the 
diverse political, economic and security concerns in the region, Tang emphasized 
that the Forum should retain its nature as a political and diplomatic forum.  It 
should also continue to work within the stage of confidence-building.  Principles 
such as non-interference in each other's internal affairs and consensus-building 
that had taken shape and proved to be effective should continue to be 
observed.122  Furthermore, he described Chinas Asia-Pacific security strategy as 
being based on safeguarding national sovereignty, development, peace and 
                                                                                                                              
good offices and co-ordination in between ARF meetings are aimed at enhancing mutual understanding and 
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regional security cooperation.123  At this meeting, China and ASEAN also made 
progress in developing a code of conduct in the South China Sea.124 
 
It was worth noting that at the meeting, Tang stated Chinas position on the 
role of the United States in the region.  He pointed out that China attached 
importance to its relations with the United States.  China welcomed a positive, 
constructive role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region and was ready to 
work with the United States to maintain peace and security in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  Meanwhile, the United States also should admit and respect Chinas 
security interest.125  This marked an adjustment in Chinas U.S. policy.  At this 
meeting, he also met U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, with the intention to 
stabilize and improve the China-U.S. relations that deteriorated following the 
EP-3 incident in May 2001. 126   Although they did not note the incident 
specifically, both of them acknowledged that the bilateral relations followed a 
period of difficulties.  Tang also noted that some improvement had occurred in 
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Chinese governments agreed to hold an April 18 meeting to discuss the causes of the mid-air collision and 
possible recommendations to avoid such incidents in the future. 
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the bilateral relations, and to develop a constructive China-U.S. relationship was 
in the fundamental interest of the two peoples.  Powell agreed and said that both 
sides could seek proper solutions to their differences in a frank and candid way, 
and that the United States needed to develop friendly ties with China.127  The 
meeting was an important illustration of the warming up of the China-U.S. 
relationship.  The ARF had served as a valuable venue for such a breakthrough. 
 
The Ninth ARF Meeting 
The ninth ARF meeting was held in Bandar Seri Begawan on 31 July 2002 
against the backdrop of a changed world situation after the 9/11 terror attacks in 
the United States.  Soon after the 9/11 event, the ARF issued a Chairman 
Statement on 4 October 2001 to make known, for the first time, its position on 
world affairs and its condemnation of the terror attacks.128  In October 2001, the 
APEC meeting in Shanghai issued APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-
Terrorism.129  During the meeting, Chinese President Jiang Zeming met with 
U.S. President George W. Bush to express Chinas determination against 
terrorism and agreed to develop a constructive relationship of cooperation with 
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the United States.130   The danger of terrorism highlighted the necessity and 
urgency of regional cooperation. 
 
China actively joined in the counter-terrorism campaign.  On 12 November 
2001, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan stated Chinas position at the UN 
Security Council meeting on terrorism.131  By the same time, China already 
acceded to nine of the existing twelve international counter-terrorism 
conventions.132  Meanwhile, China completed its domestic legal procedures for 
joining the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
and was set to become a signatory to the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.133  On 7 June 2002, China signed the 
Agreement of SCO Member States on Regional Anti-terrorism Regime at the 
second SCO summit.134 
 
At the ninth ARF meeting, China made continued efforts on counter-
terrorism.  In his speech, Tang Jiaxuan stressed the new development in the 
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global security situation in which traditional and non-traditional security factors 
were intertwined, with the latter on the rise.  He listed four dynamic changes as 
happened in the Asia-Pacific region.  Firstly, non-traditional security issues were 
gaining importance in regional security affairs and there had been a greater 
desire among countries for joint efforts to address these issues.  Secondly, 
traditional hotspot issues had been on and off, and most of them were moving 
towards resolution.  Thirdly, multilateral security dialogue and cooperation had 
been more active.  Fourthly, the question of development had become more 
prominent, with overwhelming majority of countries giving priority to their 
economic recovery and growth after the financial crisis.135 
 
Tang attached great importance to the ARFs positive role in maintaining 
peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.  He reiterated Chinas support to 
the ARF in exploring and developing dialogue and cooperation in non-traditional 
security field, including counter-terrorism, gradually expanding the participation 
of defence officers in the ARF, and continuously adhering to the existing and 
effective modalities and principles, with confidence building at the core.136  Tang 
had two suggestions for vigorous and effective cooperation within the ARF 
framework.  First, non-traditional security issues would be a highlight for 
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dialogue and cooperation in the ARF.  He pointed out that multilateral 
cooperation was the only way to tackle these issues.  Secondly, China stood in 
support for enhancing regional security dialogue and cooperation based on the 
new security concept with mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and 
coordination at its core.  Tang promised that China would participate in 
international and regional security dialogue and cooperation process with greater 
zeal and openness.137 
 
On the sidelines of the ARF meeting, Tang held talks with his counterparts 
from other countries.  When meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko 
Kawaguchi, Tang reiterated Chinas positions on historical problems between the 
two countries and the issue of Japanese politicians visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.  
He noted that the historical problems affected fundamentals of bilateral relations.  
But he also stressed that China treasured all the progress in bilateral ties and 
would continue to adopt the policy for good-neighbourliness and friendly 
cooperation with Japan.  Kawaguchi said that she fully understood the 
importance and sensitivity of the historical problems affecting bilateral relations 
and was willing to make efforts to solve them appropriately.138  At the bilateral 
meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Tang raised the Taiwan issue 
and urged the U.S. side to stop arm sales to Taiwan and cut all its official and 
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military contacts with Taiwan.  Powell pledged that the United States would 
always adhere to the one China policy, which would not be affected by any 
words or actions from the Taiwan side.  Both sides agreed to enhance bilateral 
anti-terror cooperation on a two-way and mutual-benefit basis.  They also 
believed that it was necessary for the two countries to increase dialogue and 
cooperation while enhancing mutual understanding and trust, so as to keep their 
constructive and cooperative partnership moving forward continuously.139  At the 
meeting with North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Su, Tang stressed that 
China supported North Koreas bid to improve inter-Korean relations and 
achieve self-determined peaceful reunification, and China noticed North Koreas 
recent efforts for resuming inter-Korean dialogue, inviting a U.S. envoy to visit 
North Korea and holding bilateral talks with Japan, which demonstrated its 
strong will to maintain peace and improve surrounding environments. 140  
Meeting his Indian counterpart Yashwant Sinha, Tang noted that China had kept 
a close eye on the situation in South Asia, but China had no selfish interests in 
the India-Pakistan dispute.  He introduced Chinas policy on the issue, which 
was to make peace and facilitate talks.  China hoped that India and Pakistan 
would start dialogue to ease tensions on the subcontinent.141  In the bilateral 
meeting between China and Russia, both foreign ministers pledged joint efforts 
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to implement the Sino-Russian Good-Neighbourly Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation and to push the China-Russia strategic cooperative partnership to a 
new height.142  Tang also held bilateral talks with other foreign ministers who 
attended the Forum.  In this connection, China took the ARF as a venue not only 
for multilateral diplomacy but bilateral one as well. 
 
What should be highlighted is that at the meeting China submitted Chinas 
position paper on the new security concept.  This document stated Chinas 
security conceptions and security policies that featured international dialogue 
and cooperation.  It described the new security concept as essentially rising 
above one-sided security and seeking common security through mutually 
beneficial cooperation.  Here, common security was raised as an essential 
element of the new security concept.  In the paper, the meaning of the security 
concept has evolved to be multifold with its contents extending from military 
and political to economic, science and technology, environment, culture and 
many other areas.  The means to seek security are being diversified.  
Strengthening dialogue and cooperation is regarded as the fundamental approach 
to common security.143  The paper elaborated four core ideas: mutual trust, 
mutual benefit, equality and coordination. 144   At the same time, China 
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maintained that cooperation under the new security concept should be carried 
out in flexible and diversified forms and models because of diversity of the 
world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.  The document also summarized 
Chinas security practices in Asia Pacific and demonstrated its belief that the 
key guarantee for Asian-Pacific security comes from a regional security 
framework featuring dialogue instead of confrontation. 145   Particularly, the 
importance of the ARF was emphasized for promoting regional dialogue and 
security cooperation.  This position paper was a historic document that 
illustrated Chinas changing security perceptions and increasing emphasis on 
multilateralism. 
 
The Tenth ARF Meeting 
In February 2003, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was first reported 
in Asia.  Over the next few months, SARS spread to more than two dozens 
countries in North America, South America, Europe, and Asia.  The outbreak of 
SARS had brought about a multi-faceted impact on the political, economic and 
social development in the Asia-Pacific region.  For China, it was also a harsh test 
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mutual concern so as to remove any potential dangers and prevent the outbreak of wars and conflicts.  See 




for the new administration led by Hu Jintao.  At the beginning, China was 
faulted for a lack of candour and not being more proactive in addressing the 
SARS outbreak.  This undermined the Chinese governments credibility and 
damaged its international reputation as a responsible country. 146   Very soon, 
Beijing reacted strongly regarding SARS outbreak by punishing those officials 
who held back or distorted information.  It cooperated with the World Health 
Organization (WHO), and released SARS-related information  data once held 
secret - daily.  Amid this new wave of openness, China stunned the world by 
reporting a submarine accident in early May 2003,147 which was once a state 
secrecy.  The method of Chinese government chose to deal with such a fatal 
accident illustrated its efforts to redeem the promise of greater candour and 
accountability.  Thus, the new Chinese administration led by Hu Jintao appeared 
responsible in the combat against SARS. 
 
In late April, at the China-ASEAN leaders special meeting on SARS, 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao addressed: All diseases, particularly new 
infectious diseases of unknown causes, are common enemies to mankind.  The 
cross-boundary spread of SARS poses a common challenge to the world and to 
                                                
146 For example, see the following articles: Battling SARS: Chinas Silence Costs Lives, International 
Herald Tribune, 3 April 2003; SARS Crisis Needs Better Handling, The Nation, 6 April 2003; SARS 
Could Doom Chinas Leadership role, Asia Times, 26 April 2003. 
147 According to the report of official Xinhua News Agency on 2 May 2003, seventy Chinese Navy sailors 
aboard a conventionally powered Navy submarine were killed in an accident in the water area east of 
Neichangshan.  The No. 361 submarine was taking part in a drilling east of Neichangshan Islands, when 
mechanical problems caused the accident. 
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the region in particular.148  He briefed the meeting of the measures that China 
had taken to contain the disease and made several proposals for cooperation 
between China and ASEAN against SARS.149  At the end of the special meeting, 
the leaders from China and ASEAN issued a joint statement, where the two sides 
claimed to develop and strengthen cooperation against SARS and take 
coordinated measures to reduce and eliminate its multi-faceted impact on the 
Asia-Pacific region.150  Chinas sincerity to cooperate with other countries and 
its efforts in taking effective measures to control the disease won back its 
international reputation. 
 
Against this backdrop, the tenth ARF meeting was held in Phnom Penh on 
18 June 2003.  At the meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing noted that 
the mutually beneficial cooperation was deepening and the sense of seeking 
common security and development was growing.  However, there were some 
                                                
148 China Calls for Close Cooperation with ASEAN in Fight against SARS, Renmin Ribao, 30 April 2003. 
149 These measures were: to establish a reporting mechanism with respect to epidemic and disease 
prevention and treatment; to carry out exchanges of experience and go for cooperated SARS research; to 
accelerate the bilateral health cooperation process; to coordinate border exit and entry control measures; and, 
to do everything possible to minimize the adverse effects of SARS, including the establishment of a China-
ASEAN workshop to look into possible counter-measures.  For more details, see Premier Wen Jiabaos 
Speech at the Special Meeting on SARS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 30 April 2003.  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/1136/1138/t24703.htm 
150 In the statement, the Chinese side pledged RMB 10 million yuan (about 1.2 million U.S. dollars) to 
launch a special fund in support of China-ASEAN cooperation program on SARS control and prevention 
and the eradication of its multifarious impacts.  Health ministers and other relevant officials of China and 
ASEAN members were directed to undertake the following measures: exchange information on the latest 
developments of SARS; appoint a focal/contact point in every country for the routine exchange of 
information as part of a "hotline" network to facilitate communication in an emergency; carry out 
cooperative research and training focusing on SARS spread patterns, pathology and care and treatment of 
severe SARS cases; jointly sponsor a high-level international symposium on SARS control and treatment in 
China as soon as possible; sponsor a special symposium to assess the political, security, economic and other 
possible impacts of SARS on this region; take rigorous measures for immigration and customs control to 
prevent the spread of SARS.  For more details, see ASEAN, China Issue Joint Statement on Fighting 
SARS, Renmin Ribao, 30 April 2003. 
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traditional and non-traditional security issues unresolved yet, namely, the Korean 
Peninsula issue, the threat of terrorism and religious extremist forces, and the 
outbreak of SARS.  One remarkable proposal he made was that the Forum 
should increase participation by defence officers.  This would greatly enhance 
mutual trust among countries and contribute to regional peace and stability.  In 
this context, he suggested that the ARF could sponsor a security policy 
conference at an appropriate time to be attended mainly by military personnel at 
an appropriate time.151  Finally, he promised that the new Chinese government 
led by Hu Jintao would continue to firmly implement the policy of building 
good-neighbourly relationships and partnerships with neighbouring countries, 
work closely with other Asia-Pacific countries to create a healthy and stable 
regional security environment, and make greater contribution to peace and 
development in this region.152 
 
The ARF meeting attached significance to Chinas proposals.  The 
Chairmans Statement noted that the meeting welcomed Chinas offer to convene 
the security policy conference and looked forward to Chinas submission of a 
concept paper that was to be circulated to the ARF participants.153  Chinas 
cooperation with ASEAN on non-traditional issues was highlighted as well.  The 
                                                
151 FM Stresses Asian Security Issues in ASEAN Forum, Renmin Ribao, 19 June 2003. 
152 Ibid. 
153 See Point 45, in Chairmans Statement of the Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum, Phnom Penh, 18 June 
2003.  http://www.aseansec.org/14845.htm 
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ARF meeting expressed satisfaction with the fruitful discussions on the 
implementation of the declaration and statements at the ASEAN Senior Officials 
Meeting with China.154  At this ARF meeting, China proposed to co-chair with 
Myanmar the meetings of the ISG on CBMs in the next inter-sessional year,155 
and the participating Ministers accepted it. 
 
At the same time, China became more active in cooperation with ASEAN on 
the issue of the South China Sea.  It finally signed the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at the sixth ASEAN-China summit on 
4 November 2002.156  This Chinese cooperation was highly appreciated at the 
tenth ARF meeting, which expected that the Declaration would contribute 
valuably to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific and help create the 
conditions for the peaceful settlement of the disputes.157  All this demonstrates 
that China had clearly evolved from its previous hesitance to a proactive 
participant with confidence. 
 
The Eleventh ARF Meeting 
The eleventh ARF meeting was held in Jakarta on 2 July 2004.  At the meeting, 
                                                
154 Ibid., Point 18. 
155 The meetings of the ISG on CBMs in that inter-sessional year took place in Beijing on 20-22 November 
2003 and in Yangon in April 2004. 
156 At this summit, China and ASEAN also released The Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on 
Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues on 4 November 2002. 
157 Ibid., Point 19. 
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Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing spoke highly of the positive changes in 
the security situation of the Asia-Pacific region.  He also outlined existing 
dangers and challenges, such as terrorism and extremism, non-traditional 
security challenges, and the lingering cold-war mentality.  He stressed that 
multilateral dialogue and cooperation was an effective way to deal with these 
challenges in the Asia-Pacific region.  Attaching great importance to the ARFs 
constructive role, Li noted that the ARF was an important channel to carry out 
multilateralism as well as a driving force for countries to enhance common 
security.158 
 
At this meeting, China and ASEAN agreed to convene a senior officials 
meeting under the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
and establish an ASEAN-China working group that would oversee the 
implementation of the Declaration.159 
 
The ARF Chairmans Statement gave high regard to Chinas decision to 
accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in October 
2003, and expected that this accession would contribute further to long-term 
peace and stability in the region.160   Furthermore, the Chairmans Statement 
                                                
158 Chinese FM on Regional Security at ARF Meeting, Renmin Ribao, 3 July 2004. 
159 See Point 14, in Chairmans Statement of the Eleventh ASEAN Regional Forum, Jakarta, 2 July 2004.  
http://www.aseansec.org/16245.htm 
160 The treaty formed a legal basis for relationships between ASEAN members and with countries outside 
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spoke positively of Chinas endeavours in maintaining peace and stability on the 
Korean Peninsula.  In June 2004, China hosted the third round of Six Party Talks, 
and the participating states also decided to convene the fourth Six Party Talks in 
September 2004 in Beijing. 
 
It is noteworthy that the ARF ISG on CBMs held its first meeting of the 
2003/2004 inter-sessional year in Beijing in November 2003.  At the meeting, 
China proposed to hold ARF seminars on the issues of alternative development 
and non-traditional security cooperation. 161   The meeting also discussed the 
concept paper that China submitted for its proposed security policy conference, 
and agreed to submit it to the ARF SOM in October 2004.162  The security policy 
conference was successfully held in Beijing in early November 2004.  The fact 
that China initiated and hosted this Conference is a good illustration of Chinas 





                                                                                                                              
the region.  India signed the treaty in October 2003.  Japan and Pakistan joined it in July 2004.  It was 
reported that Russia and South Korea were scheduled to sign the treaty in November 2004.  See The 
Growth and Limits of Chinas Reach in Southeast Asia, The Nation, 4 October 2004. 
161 See Point 23, in Co-Chairs Summary Report of the Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-
Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures (ISG on CBMS), Beijing, 20-22 November 
2003.  http://www.aseansec.org/15991.htm 





This study of Chinas behaviour at the ARF over the past ten years demonstrated 
the increasing weight of multilateralism in Chinas regional strategy.  China has 
become more sophisticated in adjusting itself to and exploiting the changes in 
the dynamics of the evolving regional strategic structure.  For a convenient 
review, Table 2 lists the most important activities and decisions made by China 
at each of the ARF meetings since 1994. 
 
Table 2 Chinas Activities at the ARF Meetings, 1994-2004 
 
1st ARF Meeting 
1994 
! Participating as a consultative partner 
! Recognition of security interdependence 
! Endorsement of the TAC 
! Reluctance towards stronger institutionalization of the ARF 
! Insisting that the ARF develop at a pace comfortable to every 
participant 
! Vetoed against discussing the Spratly issue at the ARF 
2nd ARF Meeting 
1995 
! Expressing the willingness to discuss the Spratly issue 
multilaterally for the first time, but only with ASEAN countries, 
and not within the ARF 
! Still trying to slow down the ARFs pace towards 
institutionalization and appearing hesitant in endorsing the Concept 
Paper 
! Objection to make CRMs into the Chairmans Statement 
3rd ARF Meeting 
1996 
! Participating as a full dialogue partner 
! Putting forward CBM suggestions 
! Introducing its new security concept for the first time 
! Agreeing to co-sponsor with the Philippines the 1997 ARF meeting 
on CBMs 
4th ARF Meeting 
1997 
! Accepting the importance of enhancing the role of the Chair but 
noting the inappropriateness for the Chairman to coordinate outside 
of the ARF meeting 
! Agreeing to discuss the competing claims in the South China Sea at 
the Forum 
! Signing of the Shanghai Agreement and the agreement on CBMs in 
the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the China-
85
 
India Border Areas was taken as positive examples of confidence 
building arrangements at the ARF ISG on CBMs.163 
5th ARF Meeting 
1998 
! Emphasizing mutual security 
! Praised for stabilizing the precarious financial situation in the Asian 
financial crisis 
! Praised for its efforts in alleviating the India-Pakistan tension 
! Praised for its contribution to regional stability through border 
agreements with Russia, India, and etc. 
6th ARF Meeting 
1999 
! Agreeing in principle to accede to the protocol to the treaty on the 
SEANWFZ 
! Willing to discuss about the code of conduct in the South China Sea 
! Expressing willingness to join the TAC 
! Agreeing to discuss the PD issue and even conflict resolution 
7th ARF Meeting 
2000 
! Criticizing the U.S. TMD program in East Asia 
! Willing to adopt a regional code on the conduct of the South China 
Sea 
! Praised for its willingness to play a positive role in regional 
cooperation 
! Submitting the Annual Security Outlook to the ARF 
8th ARF Meeting 
2001 
! Hosting the Seminar on Defence Conversion Cooperation and the 
Fourth Meeting of Heads of Defence College, Universities and 
Institutions in September 2000 
! Proposing to establish the ARF Regional Maritime Information 
Centre 
! Stating its position on the role of the United States in Asia Paicific 
9th ARF Meeting 
2002 
! Submitting its position paper on the new security concept 
! Emphasizing the importance of non-traditional security issues 
! Supporting the ARFs role in counter-terrorism 
! Supporting to expand defence officers participation in the ARF 
10th ARF Meeting 
2003 
! Proposing to increase defence officers participation 
! Suggestion on security policy conference and preparing a concept 
paper 
! Proposing to co-chair with Myanmar the meetings of the ISG on 
CBMs in the next inter-sessional year 
! Praised for signing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea 
11th ARF Meeting 
2004 
! Stressing the ARFs importance in carrying out multilateralism and 
enhancing common security 
! Praised for acceding to the TAC 
! Praised for its endeavours in maintaining peace on the Korean 
Peninsula 
! Hosting the first security policy conference 
 
After the first few ARF meetings, Chinas fear that the ARF would develop 
into an anti-China bandwagon had greatly reduced.  The structure of the Forum 
as only a dialogue mechanism and its consensus-based approach to security 
issues also helped to increase Chinas confidence.  With the ARF, the decisions 
                                                
163 See Point 9, in Summary Report of the ARF ISG on Confidence Building Measures, Beijing, 6-8 
March 1997. http://www.aseansec.org/3605.htm 
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were made in accordance with the ASEAN-motivated principle of voluntary 
acceptance or consent and consensus.  This means that there is no danger of 
being singled out as a recalcitrant.164  Unlike those multilateral organizations 
that have binding rules, the ARF has adopted a cooperative security mechanism, 
which takes dialogue as the main method.  This helps to build trust among the 
participants and move the Forum forward to the comfort of all participants.  
Accordingly, this approach greatly alleviated Chinas initial worry of being 
singled out for criticism at the Forum.  It is interesting to note that the Chinese 
position on regional multilateral security cooperation like the ARF is similar to 
that of the United States.  Both of them were sceptical of multilateral approach to 
regional security in the Asia-Pacific region during the immediate post-Cold War 
period.  However, their attitudes softened in the mid-1990s.165  This is because 
their initial misgivings about the negative impact of the multilateralism on their 
respective security interests were assuaged with the development of the ARF and 
change of regional security situation.  This shows that Chinas shifting attitude 
towards the ARF also reflects a general pattern of big powers changing position 
on multilateralism. 
 
Furthermore, with the increasing economic strength, China has become 
                                                
164 Foot, China in the ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 428. 
165 For a comprehensive discussion of the comparison of Chinese and U.S. attitudes towards the ARF, 
please see Evelyn Goh and Amitav Acharya, The ASEAN Regional Forum and US-China Relations. 
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confident of taking advantage of international multilateral forum to make known 
its positions on major international issues to better serve its national interests.  
For example, China used the venue of the ARF to criticize the U.S.-proposed 
National Missile Defence (NMD) system and TMD Program.166  Thus, the ARF, 
like other international forums, has become a useful means for China to state and 
explain its views and positions in order to seek understanding from other 
countries. 
                                                
166 Speaking at the 7th ARF Meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan pointed out that the 
development of NMD and TMD would surely disrupt the global strategic balance and lead to a new round 




Chinas Grand Strategy and Multilateral Diplomacy 
 
The previous chapter discusses Chinas behaviour at the ARF and the shift of its 
attitude towards the forum. The case of Chinas evolving ARF policies is a 
typical example that reflects Chinas evolving strategy.  At the same time, China 
also has made great progress in participating in many other international political 
and economic institutions.  This chapter introduces Chinas behaviour in other 
multilateral institutions on both global and regional levels. 
 
Chinas Multilateral Activities in Other International Organizations 
 
On the Global Level 
At present, the United Nations is the most influential inter-governmental 
organization (IGO) with the largest international membership of countries.  In 
recent years, the United Nations has ushered in a new era of multilateral 
diplomacy on various issues.167  Chinas shifting attitude towards the United 
Nations is also a typical case that shows its evolving grand strategy.  On 26 
October 1971, the UN General Assembly decided to transfer the seat of China in 
the United Nations from the Republic of China (ROC) to the PRC, which 
                                                
167 For details, see Jianwei Wang, Managing Conflict: Chinese Perspectives on Multilateral Diplomacy and 
Collective Security, Asian Perspective, vol. 22, no. 3 (1998), p. 74. 
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marked its effective entry into the global community.168  During the Cold War, 
ideological conflict separated the world into the communist and the capitalist 
camps.  The United Nations became a battleground for the two superpowers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union.  Under this situation, for a long time after its 
entry, China took a passive way by choosing to abstain on the voting on many 
UN resolutions.  For example, of the 101 resolutions adopted by the UN Security 
Council between 24 November 1971, and 22 December 1976, China posted a 
thirty-nine percent rate of abstention and non-participation.169  Up until the mid-
1990s, China frequently abstained from voting on the councils resolutions that 
invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which claimed that military force could 
be used to enforce peace. 
 
    However, since the 1990s, China has gradually changed its passiveness in 
the United Nations.  This change was best reflected in the shift of Chinas 
attitudes regarding the UN peacekeeping operations.  For example, China 
opposed and refused to get involved in the UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon 
in 1978,170 which was among few of the UN peacekeeping missions during that 
period.  Since it became a member of the UN special committee on 
                                                
168 When reviewing the history of Chinas 50-year diplomacy in late 1999, Chinas Vice-Premier Qian 
Qichen recognized the moment Chinas legal rights were restored in the United Nations in 1971 as marking 
the resumption of his countrys status in the international community.  See Chinese Vice-Premier on 
Chinas 50-Year Diplomacy, Peoples Daily, 25 September 1999. 
169 Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations, and World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979), p. 209. 
170 A. Leroy Bennett, International Organization: Principles and Issues (Englewood Cilffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 100. 
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Peacekeeping in 1988,171 it had changed its position.  In 1990, China, for the first 
time, dispatched military observers to take part in the UN Truce Supervisory 
Organization, 172  followed by its active participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations.  Since the early 1990s, China has dispatched over 1,000 personnel of 
military observers, engineering troops and civil police to take part in twelve UN 
peacekeeping operations. 173   This shift in Chinas attitude followed the 
adjustment of its foreign policy.  In 1986, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang noted 
for the first time in his government work report that multilateral diplomacy was 
an integral part of Chinas foreign policy.174  China had since become more 
active in the UN multilateral activities.  Now, with a booming economy and 
more experience within international institutions, China is more confident in 
multilateralism. 
 
    In tandem with this confidence, Chinas participation in both international 
nuclear non-proliferation and arms control organizations has also undergone 
                                                
171 China and the Peace-Keeping Actions of the UN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 15 November 
2000.  http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2594/2595/t15138.htm 
172 Ibid. 
173These actions include the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation 
Mission (UNIKOM), UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), UN Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), UN Observer Mission in 
Liberia (UNOMIL), UN Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA), UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNOMSIL), UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), UN Mission in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea (UNMEE), UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), and UN Organization Mission in 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).  See Appendix IV Participation in UN Peace-keeping 
Operations, in White Papers on National Defence in 2002.  
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/features/ndpaper2002/app4.html 
174 Han Lianhong (et al.), Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao [Contemporary Chinas Diplomacy] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1987), p. 384. 
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changes.175  China did not join any arms control and non-proliferation treaties 
until the 1990s.176   Since then, it also joined such UN organizations as the 
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization in 1996, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) in 1997, the Zangger Committee177 in 1997, and the NSG in 2004.  
China has also made a commitment to adhere to the basic tenets of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).  Furthermore, before 1983, China 
submitted no papers on disarmament to the UN Disarmament Commission in 
New York.  But by 1994, it has submitted seventeen such papers.178  Meanwhile, 
it also submitted working papers to the UN Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva.179  Thus, China has by now participated actively in all the main UN 
arms control and non-proliferation organizations. 
                                                
175 China opposed those treaties of nuclear non-proliferation signed by the Soviet Union, the United States 
and the United Kingdom in the early 1960s and 1970s.  China condemned those treaties as a tool of nuclear 
states to set unfair limitations for other countries to develop nuclear weapons.  See Qiao Weibing, 
Lengzhan Hou Zhongguo Yu Guoji Jizhi De Hudong Guanxi [The Interaction of China and International 
Mechanisms after the Cold War], Pacific Journal (Chinese), Issue 4 (2001), p. 16. 
176 China signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty in 1996, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between China and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in 1998, and the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 1993.  
For more detailed information, see Relevant Multilateral Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-
proliferation Treaties (1952-2004), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 30 June 2004.  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/tyylb/t141338.htm 
177 The purpose of the Zangger Committee, also known as the "NPT Exporters Committee", is to serve as 
the interpreter" of NPTs Article III, paragraph 2, and harmonize the interpretation of nuclear export 
control policies for NPT Parties.  The Zangger Committee maintains a Trigger List (triggering safeguards as 
a condition of supply) of nuclear-related strategic goods to assist NPT Parties in identifying equipment and 
materials subject to export controls.  The Committee is informal and that its decisions are not legally 
binding upon its members.  The relative informality of the Committee has enabled it to take the 
lead on certain nonproliferation issues that would be more difficult to resolve in the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG).  For more details about the Zangger Committee, see 
http://www.zanggercommittee.org/Zangger/default.htm  
178 Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, Chinas Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions, in 
Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China: the Management of an Emerging Power 
(London: Routledge, 1999), p. 238. 




    In the area of international economic organizations, China has proceeded 
much further.  Since the late 1970s, with its open-door policy and market-
oriented reforms, China has consistently sought to benefit from participating in 
international economic organizations.  It has joined all the major international 
economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), United Nations Childrens Fund 
(UNICEF), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
In particular, the decision by Chinese leaders to accept some stringent 
requirements for its entry into the WTO represented a significant milestone in 
Chinas integration into the international economic system.  By any measure, its 
WTO entry can be ranked as one of the most important developments in China 
since its reform began in the late 1970s.  For example, on the issue of the WTO 
required market access, China would slash both tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
imports of agricultural and industrial goods.  With respect to exports, the WTO 
required China to eliminate its various subsidy programs.  Other WTO 
requirements included ratcheting-up protection for intellectual property rights, 
increased availability of trading rights to foreign companies, and a dramatic 
opening to foreign investment of critical service sectors such as 
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telecommunications, banking, insurance, securities, and distribution.180  These 
requirements, with others as outlined in Chinas accession protocol, would place 
extremely high pressure on Chinas economic development.  However, these 
challenges did not alter Chinas strong commitment to pursuing deeper 
integration into the world economy.  Chinese leaders are aware of the negative 
aspects of the economic globalisation, but they are confident that China will 
benefit more from participating than refusing this globalisation.  Chinas 
determination to join the WTO reflected this Chinese confidence.  Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin pointed out: Joining the TWO is a strategic decision 
made by the Chinese government under the situation of economic globalisation; 
it is identical with Chinas objective of reform, opening up and establishing a 
socialist market economic structure.181  In this regard, China has gone further in 
international multilateral economic cooperation than in the security domain. 
 
    By 2000, China joined over fifty IGOs and 1,275 international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs),182 while in 1966, it was a member of only 
one IGO and 58 NGOs. 183   The expansion of Chinas membership in 
                                                
180 For more details on Chinas WTO commitments, see China in the World Economy: An OECD Economic 
and Statistical Survey (London: Kogan Page, 2003), Annex I. 
181 See Seize Opportunity, Meet Challenge, and Participate in Economic Globalisation, Renmin Ribao, 19 
December 2001. 
182 Ann Kent, Chinas Participation in International Organisations, in Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin 




international institutions was strong evidence of Chinas commitment to 
international multilateralism. 
 
On the Regional Level 
For a long time, China was regarded as a regional power without a regional 
policy.184  Its relations with almost all its neighbours before the 1980s were 
tenuous at best.  It was partly due to the bipolar rivalry during the Cold War, 
partly due to Chinas historical complacency, as it took for granted its place at 
the centre of Asias political order.  At that time, China was trying to project its 
diplomatic influence globally and paid inadequate attention to its peripheral 
interests and regional affairs.  This global-oriented diplomacy contradicted with 
Chinas real influential capacity as more than merely a regional actor, but 
still less than a global power.185   And this diplomatic oversight had led to 
serious consequences, which kept China in constant tensions with its 
neighbouring countries. 
 
    Since the 1980s, this situation has changed and China has gradually improved 
the relations with its neighbouring countries.  With the open-door policy and 
market-oriented reforms, Chinese leaders began to rethink Chinas role in the 
                                                
184 Samuel S. Kim, China In and Out of the Changing World Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), p. 84. 
185 Steven I. Levine, China in Asia: The PRC as a Regional Power, in Harry Harding (ed.), Chinas 
Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 107. 
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world and decided on a policy that would help to create a regional environment 
conducive to domestic modernization and national security.  Chinas new policy 
of good neighbourliness enabled it to improve its relations with almost all the 
neighbouring countries.  While the fact that other Asian governments shared 
similar grounds with China in the area of human rights and sympathized with 
Chinas struggle against pressures from the West contributed to better relations, 
a more critical factor for Chinas reorientation towards a more neighbourly 
policy was the diplomatic isolation imposed on China by Western nations after 
the Tiananmen incident of 1989.  In other words, the isolation from the West 
made China focus on improving its relations with neighbouring countries. 
 
In Asia-Pacific, ASEAN was a very important regional organization with 
which China has developed close links.  By the early 1990s, China had 
normalized and established diplomatic relations with all ASEAN countries.  In 
1991, China began the dialogue with ASEAN as a consultative partner and since 
then, Chinas Foreign Minister attended ASEANs foreign ministerial meeting 
every year.  Over the years, China has established a multi-layer framework of 
dialogues with ASEAN, which includes several parallel mechanisms: the ARF, 
the PMC, the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) Meeting, the ASEAN-China 
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SOM Consultations, the ASEAN-China Business Council Meeting, and the 
ASEAN- Beijing Committee.186 
 
The topics covered by the China-ASEAN dialogue ranged from economic 
issues to security affairs.  The centrepiece of the future China-ASEAN economic 
links is likely to be the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA).  In November 
2002, the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation 
between ASEAN and China was signed, setting a ten-year timeframe for the 
establishment of the FTA.187  China has also worked closely with ASEAN at 
APEC to present a common line and resist what is seen as pressure from the 
APECs Western members (led by the United States) for speedy and 
inappropriate liberalization of national economies and the dismantling of trade 
barriers.188 
 
In the area of security issues, China and ASEAN issued the Joint 
Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues at the 
Sixth ASEAN-China Summit in November 2002.189  This expanded security 
cooperation between two sides.  At the ARF, China has consistently reaffirmed 
                                                
186 ASEAN-China Dialogue, ASEAN Secretariat.  http://www.aseansec.org/5874.htm 
187 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the Association of South 
East Asian Nations and the Peoples Republic of China, Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002.  
http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm 
188 Jim Rolfe, Welcome in Asia: Chinas Multilateral Presence, in Satu Limaye (ed.), Special Assessment: 
Asias China Debate (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2003), p. 4. 
189 Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, 
Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002.  http://www.aseansec.org/13185.htm 
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ASEAN as being in the drivers seat.  From the very beginning of the ARF, 
China and ASEAN share the same position that the ARF should proceed at a 
pace acceptable to every participant.  They also share the expectations that the 
ARF should play a balancing role in regional security environment of Asia 
Pacific.  Even on the sensitive issue of the South China Sea, China changed its 
attitude from refusing to discuss it with the ASEAN grouping to agreeing to talk 
about it at the annual dialogue between China and ASEAN since 1997.  
Although China does not intend to give up its sovereignty in the South China 
Sea, it does not want to see any eruption of tension with ASEAN.  China needs a 
peaceful and stable environment for its domestic economic development.  It also 
needs cooperation and support of ASEAN on many international occasions, such 
as on the issues of human rights and trade.  Moreover, when compared to the 
Taiwan problem, the issue of the South China Sea is less important to China.  To 
win strong support from ASEAN on the Taiwan issue, China has taken a more 
reconciliatory strategy in the South China Sea.  It is true that ASEAN countries 
still have suspicions on Chinas position in the South China Sea, but the 
opportunities for economic and political cooperation with China have largely 
relieved their worries.  Moreover, in ASEANs view, the recent Chinese 
approach in multilateral institutions is consistent to the so-called ASEANs 
Gulliver Strategy, which is intended to enmesh China in regional economic 
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and security organizations in order to persuade China to conform to the norms 
that would support regional stability.190 
 
In Central Asia, it seems that China has fostered a more institutionalised 
relationship with the regional countries than that with the ASEAN states.  In 
1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan joined together to 
set up the Shanghai Five.  In 2001, on the basis of the Shanghai Five mechanism, 
the SCO (including previous five members plus Uzbekistan) was formally 
established.  The SCO was the first multilateral group in the region.  China 
played a central role on the institutionalisation of this multilateral group.191  For 
China, the SCO has helped to extend its influence through a formal channel to 
the Central Asia and maintain stability of its borders.  Thus it will help to 
balance the U.S. influence in the region.  China also hopes to get support from 
these countries in Central Asia to contain separatist movement in Chinas 
Xinjiang.  Meanwhile, the SCO mechanism would also help Chinas access to 
the rich oil resources in Central Asia.  For the Central Asian countries, Chinas 
multilateral approach to the region is welcome because it would enhance their 
                                                
190 Robert Sutter, Chinas Recent Approach to Asia: Seeking Long Term Gains, NBR Analysis, vol. 13, no. 
1, p. 23.  http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/vol13no1/essay_Sutter.html 
191 Chinas leaders and foreign ministers emphasized the importance and acceleration of organizational 
building in several speeches.  For example, see President Jiang Zemings speech at the SCO St. Petersburg 
Summit in 2002, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/1128/1130/t4510.htm; President Hu 
Jintaos speech at the SCO Moscow Summit in 2003, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/1128/1130/t24657.htm; Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuans 
speech at the SCO Foreign Ministers Conference in 2002, 
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own security and also provide great economic opportunities for their 
development.  After all, most of the Central Asian countries are still wary of 
Chinas increasing power.  They also intend to apply the Gulliver Strategy as 
ASEAN does. 
 
In Northeast Asia, Chinas multilateral diplomacy focuses on the Korean 
issue.  Since the sudden death of its leader Kim Il Sung in 1994, North Korea 
faces political uncertainties, declining economic conditions, and growing 
international pressures.  This situation had increased Chinas concern on the 
future stability of North Korea and the whole Korean Peninsula. 
 
For a long time, China had always insisted that the Korean conflict should 
be bilaterally settled, between the two Koreas as well as between North Korea 
and the United States.  In April 1997, the U.S. President Bill Clinton and South 
Koreas President Kim Young Sam proposed a four-party meeting, including the 
two Koreas, the United States and China, to replace the settlement that ended the 
Korean War with a formal peace treaty.  However, for a moment China did not 
want to be involved directly in this multiparty approach so it appeared lukewarm 
to the idea.  Another reason for Chinas reluctance to get involved was that the 
United States and South Korea failed to consult China in the initial discussion on 
the proposal.  It was reported that China made the arrangement for the two 
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Koreas to hold a secret bilateral meeting in Beijing after the U.S.-South Korea 
proposal was put on the table. 
 
However, by July 1997, China had changed its position and began to 
support the multiparty talks.  The Chinese foreign ministry announced that both 
as a signatory of the Korean armistice agreement and a neighbouring country, 
China would agree to participate in the quadrilateral talks and play a constructive 
role in the process of establishing a peace mechanism.192 
 
In early October 2002, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly 
informed North Korean officials that the United States was aware that North 
Korea had a program underway to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons.193  
North Korea denied this allegation at first but later it confirmed the U.S. claim 
and declared the Agreed Framework194 nullified.  Beijing realised that China 
should engage more actively to maintain a stable and peaceful Korean Peninsula 
for its own national interests.  China doesnt want to be dragged into a direct 
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193 Nuclear Weapons Program, Federation of American Scientists, 9 June 2003.  
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confrontation with the United States over North Korea.  At the same time, China 
believes that its interests are best served by maintaining good relations with the 
two Koreas.  It uses economic aid and political exchanges to maintain its 
relations with North Korea, while working closely with South Korea and the 
United States in seeking a peaceful resolution.195  Also, China attempts to bring 
all the relevant parties together to discuss the issue in search for a diplomatic 
solution.  Thus in April 2003, with the Chinese initiative, North Korea and the 
United States sat down for a trilateral meeting in Beijing.  Although the meeting 
did not produce substantive results, it marked a good start for solving the nuclear 
issue through dialogue.  In August 2003, China managed to bring about a six-
party talk with the two Koreas, the United States, Japan and Russia.  China has 
received international praise for activating the multiparty talks and its efforts in 
pushing forward the multiparty talks were welcome in the region.  For example, 
the United States has stressed Chinas importance in the six-party talks and 
expressed the hope that China would keep playing an essential role in the 
process.196  Other parties of the talk also highly complimented the important role 
of China in the talks, expressing thanks to China for its thoughtful arrangements 
for the parties.197  To a certain extent, Chinas success in promoting multiparty 
                                                
195 Sutter, op. cit., p. 24. 
196It was noted in the interview with the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in Bangkok.  See U.S. 
Exploring Multilateral Security Assurances for N. Korea, Embassy of the United States, Japan, 21 October 
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197 The Third Round of the Beijing Six-Party Talks Concluded, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 26 
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talks on the Korean issue helped to enhance its pivot position in security affairs 
of Northeast Asia. 
 
    China has actively participated not only in regional governmental 
organizations, but also in non-governmental and track-two processes, for 
instance, its active participation in the Council for Security Cooperation in the 
Asia Pacific (CSCAP)198.  The CSCAP was described at the time of its formation 
as the most ambitious proposal for a regularised, focused and inclusive non-
governmental process on Asia Pacific security matters, and as one of the most 
important developments in regional security since the end of the Cold War.  Yet, 
from 1993 to 1994, China did not join the CSCAP because of Beijings concern 
about the seat of Taiwan in the institution.  Through two-year negotiations, 
China entered the CSCAP in December 1996 on a conditional basis.199  This 
underscored Chinas commitment to regional security cooperation.  After its 
entry, China attended every meeting of the steering committee and five working 
groups.  It also co-chaired the Working Group on Comprehensive and 
Cooperative Security with Malaysia and New Zealand.  The sincerity and 
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sophistication with which China has engaged the regional mechanism has been 
clearly observed.200  In the CSCAP, the Chinese presence has raised the level of 
discussion.  China has been increasingly involved in regional security 
mechanisms. 
 
Chinas Security Objectives in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
Chinas multilateral activities, either on global or regional level, are guided 
within the framework of its grand strategy,201 which is designed to achieve the 
status of a true great power that would influence, rather than simply respond to, 
the international system.  At the moment, China is not yet a global power 
although it has gained rapid economic development and increased its national 
capabilities.  The Asia-Pacific region is still the focus of Chinas security 
concerns.  Therefore, for further understanding of its multilateral diplomacy, it is 
necessary to identify Chinas key security objectives and interests in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
 
As discussed above, China has begun to reassess its policy approaches since 
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of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993); Thomas J. Christensen, Useful 
Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: 
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the 1990s.  Based on the adjusted evaluation of its national power and position in 
the world, China has put more emphasis on building its relations with the 
neighbouring countries.  As a regional power, Chinas security strategy in the 
Asia Pacific generally focuses on the following objectives: 
 
# To safeguard national unity and territorial integrity; 
# To maintain a stable and peaceful international situation in its periphery 
and establish good relations with its neighbouring countries; 
# To secure the foreign policy environment at a time of domestic 
preoccupation; and 
# To build up a good international reputation as a responsible power. 
 
To fulfil these strategic goals, China believes that a regional security 
regime to advance mutual understanding and trust is helpful to ensure 
regional political stability and economic development.  This is a very 
important reason behind Chinas gradual involvement in developing the 
regional security regime, such as the ARF. But China insists that there 
should be some principles for the regional mechanism to adhere to, 
namely:202 
                                                
202 Zhu Majie, China and Asia-Pacific Security Building in the New Century, in David W. Lovell (ed.), 




# The mechanism must be based on the Five Peaceful Co-existence 
Principles, and no country should seek regional hegemony; 
# Disputes between countries must be solved peacefully, and if an 
immediate solution is not available, relevant disputes could be shelved 
and normal exchanges between countries should be maintained; 
# Armament must be maintained at the level that is necessary for a 
countrys proper defence; and 
# All the nuclear powers must take the obligation of not using nuclear 
weapons first and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear countries. 
 
Chinas Security Concerns vis-à-vis the United States and Japan 
 
Behind Chinas growing support for multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
region, there is a constant worry about the influence of the United States in the 
region, in particular the U.S. bilateral alliances and Japans pursuit of political 
and military power in its national policy. 
 
The United States has forward deployments in the Asia-Pacific region, 
maintains formal security treaties with Japan and South Korea, and is the 
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primary supplier of weapons to Taiwan.  To ensure a constructive regional 
security environment, it is important for China to well manage its relations with 
the United States, which is the only superpower in the post-Cold War era.  The 
potential threat from a hostile United States tops the list of Chinas security 
concerns.  Specifically, it is concerned about the expansion and strengthening of 
the U.S. alliances and their intervention.  Chinese officials believe that they must 
be on guard to counter actions by the United States and its expanded alliances 
that are detrimental to Chinese interests, notably regarding Taiwan. 203   The 
Taiwan problem has been the most important and sensitive issue between China 
and the United States.  The United States actually holds an ambiguous attitude 
on the One China Principle.  It maintains a de-facto defence relationship with 
Taiwan through the provisions of its 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.  In the Chinese 
eyes, the United States acquiesces to, or even actively supports, Taiwans effort 
for greater international space 204  and de jure independence.  When China 
conducted missile tests during 1995-96 in the hope of weakening the separatist 
sentiment on Taiwan, the United States dispatched two aircraft carrier battle 
groups to the area around Taiwan.  This told Beijing of a possible scenario of 
armed conflict in the Straits involving the United States.205  On the issue of the 
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TMD system, Beijing is concerned about its effect for eventually neutralizing 
Chinas short to mid-range ballistic missiles, and the prospect of the United 
States providing TMD to Taiwan.  China insists: China cannot commit itself to 
renouncing the use of force as a final resort to halt the independence of Taiwan 
and foreign intervention into Taiwan. 206   It believes that force is also the 
guarantee that the Taiwan issue might be resolved peacefully.  In the Chinese 
view, if the United States provides TMD to Taiwan, it will lead some separatists 
on Taiwan to feel protected and encourage them to move further towards 
independence. 
 
While China views the United States as the most pressing challenge to 
Chinas national security,207 it also regards Japan as its most likely long-term 
challenge, at least in the Asia-Pacific region.  The history of Japans invasion of 
China left a deep impression on the relationship between the two countries.  
Japans attitude towards its wartime aggression, for example, downplaying 
atrocities of the Nanjing Massacre and revising history textbooks in the public 
schools, has intensified Chinas aversion to Japan.  There is an ancient Chinese 
saying: Qianshi Buwang, Houshi Zhishi, which means past experience is a guide 
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for the future.  But Japan tries to deny its aggression and war atrocities.  China is 
then worried about the revival of Japanese militarism as Japans impressionistic 
younger generation, who does not know the invasion history, would be more 
susceptible to hawkish elites plans to increase military power.  At the same time, 
China is also doubtful of Japans commitment to a peaceful foreign policy and 
the U.S.-Japanese alliance.  Since the announcement of the revised guidelines for 
the U.S.-Japan security relationship in 1996, China has been worried of the 
growing possibility that this alliance will broaden Japans strategic role in East 
Asia.208  In particular, China takes issue with the reference in the guidelines that 
the scope of the alliance covers situations in areas surrounding Japan and that 
the concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not geographic but 
situational.209  In Chinas reading, it hinted that Taiwan and its surrounding 
waters might be included.  So China immediately sought for Japans clarification 
on this point.  But Japan pointedly refrained from providing sufficiently explicit 
assurances,210 which accentuated Chinas worry regarding the potential that the 
alliance would turn out to be a tool for defending an independent or permanently 
separated Taiwan.  Thus, it is clear to Beijing that one purpose of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance is to constrain Chinas power in the region.  To counter this, China has 
endeavoured to weaken this alliance by, for example, emphasizing the 
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multilateral institutions in the region such as the ARF, where the United States 
does not have the leadership. 
 
However, it should be pointed out that China does not intend to push the 
United States out of Asia Pacific.  On the one hand, China does not have the 
capacity to confront the United States.  On the other, at least at present, there is 
no such a need.  China still recognizes the positive role of the American military 
presence in the region, especially its function as a bottle cap over Japanese 
power.211  In this regard, Chinas multilateral diplomacy is not intended to go 
into conflict with the United States, but to secure for itself a better bargaining 
position vis-à-vis the United States. 
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Chinas Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
This thesis explores Chinas behaviours at the ARF to illustrate its evolving 
regional security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.  Behavioural changes 
reflect perceptual adjustments.  The change of Chinas attitude towards the ARF 
and international and regional multilateralism is observed in this thesis. 
 
As the previous chapters pointed out, though China participated in 
multilateral diplomacy in the early post-Cold War period, its behaviours in 
international institutions showed its reluctance.  As one scholar noted, Chinas 
participation in multilateral regimes at that time was mainly in order to 
symbolize the PRCs formal status as a country that must be included when 
deliberating matters of regional or global importance.212  But since the mid-
1990s, China changed its attitude towards multilateral institutions.  China no 
longer bears the aloof posture of an outsider looking in and sizing up the 
game, 213  but gradually has become an active player in international 
organizations and regimes.  The case of Chinas participation in the ARF 
represents such a change. 
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As Chapter 1 describes, the end of the Cold War meant the collapse of the 
bipolar framework and brought about the rise of multilateralism as a global 
phenomenon.  The Asia-Pacific region was no exception.  Moreover, the security 
uncertainties in the region after the Cold War called for building a pan-regional 
regime to maintain the regional security order.  Under this situation, the ARF 
was established as a multilateral security institution with the largest membership 
in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
For the creation of the ARF, there were various calculations of security 
interests among its member states.  At the drivers seat, ASEAN, the group of 
small powers, hoped to maintain its post-Cold War relevance in a new regional 
security structure and engage major powers in a multilateral framework to 
maintain a stable and peaceful regional environment after the Cold War.   The 
United States took such a multilateral forum as a supplement to its bilateral 
alliance networks in the Asia-Pacific region and the ARF offered the 
opportunity to broaden the U.S. hegemonic system by incorporating former 
adversaries such as China and Russia.214  For Japan, the ARF was a vehicle to 
increase its regional influence and play some important role in promoting a new 
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security order while maintaining the existing security arrangements including the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. 
 
ASEAN countries kept a cautious attitude towards Chinas rise.  Their 
strategy was to entangle China into institutional checks-and-balances and 
persuade it to conform to international norms and rules, which would help 
regional stability.  Another motivation was to gain an advantageous position in 
bargaining with China on the issue of the South China Sea.  Indeed, Chinas later 
concession on the South China Sea could be regarded as a partial success of 
ASEANs strategy at the ARF.  Similarly, the United States and Japan both had 
the intention to engage China within a multilateral security framework.  More 
than that, Washington took the ARF as an additional testing ground for theories 
and expectations of socialization regarding the engagement of China,215 a result 
of its strategic indecision on how to deal with China in the post-Cold War 
setting. 
 
China was aware of other states considerations of the strategic 
engagement.  At first, it was concerned that the ARF would be used to 
internationalise the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea issue, which China 
preferred to manage bilaterally.  So China initially appeared lukewarm towards 
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the formation and development of the ARF.  As discussed in Chapter 2, during 
the period of the first and second ARF meetings, Chinas participation could be 
described as a mix of doubt, reluctance and defensiveness.  However, China did 
not want to be excluded from regional security discussions, and the Forum also 
provided a good opportunity for China to express its peaceful intentions and 
dispel the regions suspicion regarding Chinas ambition for hegemonism.  
Moreover, the ARF operated on the ASEAN-inspired principles of consensus 
rather than majoritarianism,216 and a step-by-step incrementalism that proceeds 
at a pace acceptable to all participants, including China.  So China attended the 
ARF, out of the defensive purpose of reiterating its official positions.  
Nevertheless, since 1996, China has become more active at the ARF.  It was 
assured that the ARF would not develop into an anti-China bandwagon.  But 
more importantly, with its economic success and greater familiarity with 
multilateral regimes, China has become confident in dealing with the ARF. 
 
As Chapter 3 describes, similar changes also took place in Chinas 
participation and involvement in other multilateral organizations besides the 
ARF.  In the United Nations, Chinas gradual involvement in peacekeeping 
operations since the mid-1990s reflected this change.  During the same period, 
the quantity and quality of Chinas participation in the international nuclear non-
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proliferation and arms control organizations also increased greatly.  Regarding 
the interaction with multilateral economic institutions, China went much further 
than in the security area.  Chinas entry into the WTO was a remarkable 
achievement in its history of incorporation into the global economic system.  
To become a respectable member in the system, to enjoy equal trading 
treatment, and to play a part in the making of trade regulations, 217  were 
interpreted as Chinas major motives for accessing into the WTO.  Actually, 
deeper involvement in economic interdependence has greatly influenced Chinas 
decision for a deeper involvement in multilateral security regimes. 
 
Apart from the ARF, China also participated in many other multilateral 
regimes in the Asia-Pacific region.  Chinas multilateral diplomacy in Southeast 
Asia, Central Asia and even Northeast Asia has made great progress.  Although 
there exist some competition and conflict between China and ASEAN, their 
cooperation in many economic and security areas is still moving forward.  
Chinas endeavours in the formation and development of the SCO have 
confirmed its constructive role in regional cooperation.  In Northeast Asia, China 
has contributed in bringing the relevant parties to sit together to discuss the 
security situation in the Korean Peninsular. 
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All these changes reflected an adjustment in Chinas grand security 
strategy.  China has learned that bilateral diplomacy is not the only way for its 
national interests and multilateralism does not necessarily hurt Chinas interest.  
Being involved in rule-setting processes, China could exert its influence on the 
development of multilateral institutions for its own interests.  This is better than 
being excluded and left without a venue and chance to slope the opinions.  
Moreover, China is conscious of the other states, especially its neighbours, 
concern over its rapid rise.  Thus, joining in the regional community and 
discussing issues covering economic and security areas have been part of 
Chinas effort to alleviate their worries.  China has long argued that a peaceful 
and stable environment was crucial to sustain its economic growth, which 
remains the top priority.  Being a responsible power is the image that China 
seeks for itself in the international community. 
 
To analyse Chinas security concerns, the factors of the United States and 
Japan cannot be neglected.  It is believed that one of the aims of the U.S.-
Japanese alliance is to constrain China, especially targeted at the Taiwan issue.  
As a consequence, Chinas proactive behaviour in multilateral regimes could be 
partly understood as a response to the possibility of negative influences of the 
U.S. bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.  However, it does not mean 
that China intends to build an enduring multilateral coalition to counter the U.S. 
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alliances.  Although the belief in the inevitability of multipolarity has been 
discussed frequently in Chinese official documents and research papers, China 
still acknowledges, at least inwardly, that the United States will stay as the sole 
global hegemonic power for decades to come.218  As one scholar argued, China 
has neither the capability nor the desire to take the lead in formulating such a 
coalition.219  One of its intentions behind multilateral diplomacy may be to set 
itself in a better position in negotiating with the United States. 
 
Theoretical Applications in Chinas Security Strategy 
 
After examining the changes in Chinas external behaviours and regional 
security strategy, this study observes that no existing theoretical framework can 
fully explain these changes.  This author takes the view that realist perspectives 
are deeply embedded in traditional Chinese strategic culture,220  which has a 
profoundly influence in todays Chinese strategic thinking.  Chinas concerns 
about the relations with the United States and Japan are also consistent with 
realist views of concepts such as the balance of power and security dilemma.  
However, realism cannot convincingly explain Chinas support of multilateral 
                                                
218 For a detailed discussion from Chinese views, see Men Honghua, Lengzhan Hou Meiguo Da Zhanlue 
De Zhengming Jiqi Yiyi [The Debate on post-Cold War US Grand Strategy and Its implications], in Hu 
Angang and Men Honghua (eds.), Jiedu Meiguo Da Zhanlue [Decoding US Grand Strategy] (Hangzhou: 
Zhejiang Renmin Chubanshe, 2003), pp. 3-22. 
219 Wang Jisi, Chinas Changing Role in Asia (Occasional Papers of the Atlantic Council, January 2004), p. 
15.  http://www.acus.org/Publications/occasionalpapers/Asia/WangJisi_Jan_04.pdf 
220 For an in-depth discussion, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand 
Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
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approaches to resolve Asia-Pacific security issues.  Nor can it explain why China 
takes economy as its priority and is willing to share power with the United 
States.  Taking liberalism into account, it is true that global economic 
interdependence has inevitably influenced Chinas worldview, and its active 
participation in multilateral organizations could be rationalized from the 
liberalist angle.  However, liberalism proves inadequate in describing the 
security relations among the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region and 
consequently Chinas considerations in dealing with the United States and Japan. 
 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to construct a new theory to provide a 
perfect answer to the changes in Chinas security thinking.  However, it is 
suggested that it would be useful to include the element of cultural 
differentiation in exploring Chinas case.  Chinese thinking stems from its own 
traditional culture that differs from the Western civilization.  The current 
mainstream international relations theories are mainly based on the Western 
experiences, and a realist perspective has provided a part, but not a whole, of the 
explanation of Chinas case.  Despite the changes in its external behaviours in 
the multilateral organizations, the core of Chinas predominant paradigm is still 
national interest that remains unchanged.  China has a long history and unique 
traditional culture.  The Confucianism, which has dominated Chinese thinking 
on political and social life for the past two thousand years, continues to influence 
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Chinas current worldview and strategic thinking.  Maybe it will be more 
appropriate to delineate Chinas security strategy in a modified realist framework 
with Chinese characteristics, and it may be called Chinese realism. 
 
Chinas Future Role in the ARF and the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
Based on the observations of the evolution of Chinas involvement in the ARF 
over the years, this author is of the view that China hopes to steer the ARF in a 
way suited to its own pace and wishes, and this situation is likely to continue to 
characterize the China-ARF relationship in the coming decades.  As long as 
China and ASEAN concur on the principle of Qiutong Cunyi [seeking 
common ground while reserving differences] in the Asia-Pacific region, there is 
no reason to believe that China will cease its support for the multilateral 
mechanism whereby ASEAN plays the leading role.  Cautiously, but steadily, 
China is moving forward as a more active player in the multilateral regimes, and 
there is no evidence that China will not continue along this path.  
 
Finally, the thesis emphasizes that, like most countries, China seeks to 
maximize its interests by participating in international organizations and has 
demonstrated its willingness to accept the costs as well as the benefits of 
participation and to assume some responsibility within the international system.  
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But in the process of its integration into the international system, China still 
takes the Asia-Pacific region as its focus.  To keep the region peaceful and stable 
is beneficial for China, and this should continue to be an important objective of 
its security strategy.  It is important for China to maintain its good 
neighbourliness policy and play a constructive role in the regional security 
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A refers to the ARF Ministerial Meeting and ISG (Number shows the xxth 
meeting). 
C represents CSCAP (Number shows the year of the meeting). 
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CSBM means Confidence and Security-Building Measures. 
S refers to the ARF Track II Seminar (Number shows xxth meeting). 
* <shows the definition and principles of the Preventive Diplomacy at the 8th 
ARF> 
▪ <shows the measures officially adopted at the ARF meeting> 
 
Source: Ken Jimbo, Emerging Feature of Multilateral Security in Asia-Pacific: 
From Double Track to Multi-Layered Security System, presented at the 2nd 
Asia Economic Summit: Securing Asias Future in an Uncertain World (Kuala 





List of the ARF Intersessional Meetings Held in China 





Year Title of Meetings Venues Dates 
1 July 1996 - July 1997 
ISG on CBMs 
(Track I) Beijing 
6 - 8 March 
1997 
The Proliferation of Weapons and the 
Effectiveness of Non-Proliferation 
Regimes Regarding Northeast Asia 
(Track II) 
Beijing 
8 - 10 
November 
1998 
Symposium on Tropical Hygiene and 




25 - 27 
November 
1998 
2 July 1998 - July 1999 
The Asian Economic Crisis and 
Implications for Regional Security 
Cooperation 
(Track II) 
Beijing 24  26 May 1999 
3 July 1999 - July 2000 
ARF Professional Training 
Programme on China's Security Policy 
(Track I) 
Beijing 10 - 19 October 1999 
4th Meeting of Heads of Defence 
Colleges and Institutions 
(Track I) 
Beijing 
6 - 8 
September 
2000 




20 - 22 
September 
2000 4 
July 2000 - 
July 2001 
CSCAP Workshop on Asia and 






- 2 December 
2000 
5 July 2001 - July 2002 
11th Meeting of the CSCAP Working 
Group on Transnational Crime 
(Track II) 
Shanghai 13-14 May 2002 
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6 July 2002 - June 2003 




25 - 27 
September 
2002 
7 July 2003 - July 2004 
ISG on CBM 
(Track I) Beijing 




Source: ASEAN Secretariat, List of ARF Track I Activities, 






China, the United States, and Other Major Northeast Asian 
Countries Participation in International Organizations 
(1994  2002) 
 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
50 49 51 52 52 51 50 49 46
China 955 1013 1079 1136 1191 1258 1275 1366 1406
20 18 18 18 18 18 17 18 19
North 
Korea 175 179 186 185 187 184 172 181 183
47 48 50 51 52 51 52 51 49
South 
Korea 1034 1072 1138 1200 1250 1301 1315 1387 1431
62 61 63 63 63 63 63 61 59
Japan 1863 1889 1970 2019 2059 2124 2122 2246 2279
62 64 64 65 64 63 63 62 61The 
United 
States 2273 2327 2418 2490 2560 2648 2685 2858 2891
48 58 62 61 63 66 60 63 62
USSR 
/Russia 822 1093 1300 1492 1582 1673 1752 1901 1928
Global 263 266 260 258 254 251 241 243 232
Total 4928 5121 5472 5585 6020 6076 6177 6357 6398
 
 
Note: Intergovernmental organizations figures are in bold type throughout the 
table; international non-governmental organization figures are in lightface type. 
 
Source: Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International 
Organizations, 1994-2002. 
